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THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS 
DAVID V. SNYDER* 
This Article considers, from legal, practical, moral, and policy perspectives, 
Model Contract Clauses (MCCs) to protect the human rights of workers in 
international supply chains.  The product of the ABA Business Law Section 
Working Group to Draft Human Rights Protections in International Supply 
Contracts, the MCCs are an effort to provide companies with carefully researched 
and well-drafted clauses to incorporate human rights policies into supply contracts 
(purchase orders, master vendor agreements, and the like).  The Article discusses 
the impetus, goals, and strategies of the MCCs and explains the paradigm of the 
corporate, operational, and political landscape for which they are designed, 
including the seeming lack of emphasis on worker health and safety.  An overview 
of some of the doctrinal issues and solutions is provided, emphasizing the objective 
                                               
 *  Professor of Law and Director, Business Law Program, American University 
Washington College of Law.  Many thanks to those who have aided my (still evolving) 
thinking and writing on this subject, including Susan Carle, Muriel Fabre-Magnan, 
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of the MCCs to be legally effective and operationally likely.  On a more theoretical 
note, it is argued that international supply chain contracts that attend to moral 
issues like the human rights, health, and safety of workers are a new kind of social 
contract, supplementing but not supplanting more classical notions of the social 
contract, with which they share some characteristics.  In particular, the moral 
nature of these supply chain agreements is likened to the normative goals of the 
social contract, but these new social contracts necessarily move in more contemporary 
directions because they are typically constituted by multinational enterprises—
corporations quite different from the individuals and states conceived by the classical 
theorists.  In addition, supply contracts, and the supply chains that they constitute, 
cross state lines and geographic boundaries, reaching past the nation-state.  After 
arguing that companies have a moral duty to the workers in their supply chains, the 
Article suggests that companies should protect them through voluntary contractual 
undertakings such as those in the MCCs.  The place of public regulation is 
considered as well, including the possibility of Good Samaritan-style protection for 
companies that take ameliorative steps.  Finally, the role of experimentalist 
governance in a possible new version of the MCCs is considered briefly. 
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The common law has traditionally eschewed theory and the statement 
of broad principle, but this does not mean that its instinct for the 
possible and the practical cannot be justified in terms of principle.1 
—Alexander McCall Smith 
INTRODUCTION 
This contribution offers an academic consideration of the Model 
Contract Clauses (MCCs) published by the ABA Business Law Section 
Working Group to Draft Human Rights Protections in International 
Supply Contracts (the “Working Group”).2  The Article takes on several 
different tasks.  It explains the impetus, goals, and strategies behind 
the MCCs and the basic paradigm for which they were designed.  It 
also suggests that international supply chain contracts that attend to 
the human rights, health, and safety of workers are a new kind of social 
contract.  On a related note, the Article argues that companies bear a 
moral responsibility to the workers in their supply chains, and that the 
companies can fulfill that responsibility, in part, through appropriate 
supply contracts.  In short, supply contracts that transform moral 
duties into legal ones in a globalized, extraterritorial economic world 
                                               
 1. Alexander McCall Smith, The Duty to Rescue and the Common Law, in THE DUTY 
TO RESCUE:  THE JURISPRUDENCE OF AID 55, 56 (Michael A. Menlow & Alexander McCall 
Smith eds., 1993).  Professor McCall Smith is nowadays famous as a novelist, but for 
many years he was a distinguished law professor. 
 2. David V. Snyder & Susan A. Maslow, Human Rights Protections in International 
Supply Chains—Protecting Workers and Managing Company Risk:  2018 Report and Model 
Contract Clauses from the Working Group to Draft Human Rights Protections in International 
Supply Contracts, 73 BUS. LAW. 1093 (2018) [hereinafter Model Contract Clauses]. 
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are a new kind of social contract.  The legal and policy implications of 
these arguments are also considered. 
This newer social contract provides a necessary supplement to the 
social contract conceived by the Enlightenment thinkers and their 
classical predecessors.3  Through the lens of social contract theory, we 
can see how the privately ordered, contractual structure of a large, 
complex, and far-reaching supply chain, often involving thousands of 
people directly or indirectly, takes on the kind of organizational functions 
of a social contract in order to achieve mutually beneficial cooperative 
relationships.  At the same time, this lens brings into focus some of the 
moral aspects of contracting, illuminating central and ancient ideas about 
law and its functions and goals, obligations with their implications and 
imperfections, and lawyers with their multiple duties and hopes. 
Frequently this lawyerly work is technical and obscure, but 
sometimes, tragically, it blares from the front page.  At least since the 
sweatshop scandals of the 1990s, the problem has flared into Western 
consciousness every few years, sometimes because of human 
trafficking, modern slavery, or child labor, and more recently because 
of catastrophic factory fires and building collapses.  Many recall when 
Tazreen Fashions, a garment factory in Dhaka, Bangladesh, caught fire 
and killed 112 people, with many more seriously injured.  The factory 
had employed about 1500 workers and produced clothes for retailers 
such as Walmart and Sears.  The building had been found in violation 
of safety standards, including fire exits.4  A few months later, another 
                                               
 3. It is also a different kind of “new social contract” than that expounded by Ian 
Macneil in his relational theory of contract, see THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT:  AN 
INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACT RELATIONS xii (1980), and certainly not the same as 
the “National Bargain” of Robert Reich, see THE WORK OF NATIONS:  PREPARING 
OURSELVES FOR 21st-CENTURY CAPITALISM, ch. 5 (1991), or Jill Esbenshade’s “social 
contract” whereby “working-class brothers and sisters” commit “to contain their 
struggle” while employers “commit[] to share their rising profits” and the government 
“commit[s] to regulate and mediate the relationship and to provide a crucial safety 
net,” see MONITORING SWEATSHOPS:  WORKERS, CONSUMERS, AND THE GLOBAL APPAREL 
INDUSTRY 13 (2004) (citing REICH). 
 4. See, e.g., Steve Henn, Factory Audits and Safety Don’t Always Go Hand in Hand, 
NPR (May 1, 2013, 10:26 AM), http://www.npr.org/2013/05/01/180103898/foreign-
factory-audits-profitable-but-flawed-business; Matt Stiles, Documents:  Wal-Mart Auditors 
Inspect Bangladesh Factory, Find Safety Flaws, NPR (Apr. 30, 2013, 6:48 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/2013/04/30/180123158/documents-wal-mart-auditors-inspect-
bangladeshi-factory-find-safety-flaws.  The effectiveness of monitoring and audit 
schemes is beyond the scope of this Article, but those issues are certainly relevant.  For 
a perspective on the issue, consider ESBENSHADE, supra note 3, including the literature 
review in chapter 6.  For another, more recent, perspective, see RICHARD M. LOCKE, 
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Dhaka factory collapsed, resulting in the deaths of 1129 people.  The 
collapse occurred just one day after inspection teams had discovered 
structural flaws in the building.  Some businesses in the building had 
closed because of the unsafe conditions, but others ordered their 
employees to work, where they were crushed to death.5  There have been 
many other disasters, not only in Bangladesh, killing and maiming 
workers.6  There will be more. 
This project is motivated by two crucial ideas:  horrifying things happen 
in international supply chains too often, and lawyers want—and are 
able—to help.  Business lawyers, because they are close to the companies 
and contracts that animate the supply chain, are uniquely positioned to 
achieve progress.7  The MCCs are designed to help lawyers in this work—
the technical aspects of which are unusually difficult—and to provide a 
clear value proposition to companies to persuade them to adopt 
ameliorative policies.  The goal is to implement policies that are legally 
effective and operationally likely to protect the human rights of workers. 
The MCCs are simultaneously ambitious and modest.  Their ambition 
is to have a real effect for real people.  The basis for this hope is the ability 
of contracts to allow planning, promising, verification, and remediation.  
The customary place of contracts in the legal and business worlds grounds 
this hope:  contracts are taken seriously; they are used in management, 
operations, and manufacturing as well as in the legal world; and their 
function and efficacy in the legal world gives them more force elsewhere. 
At the same time, the MCCs are purely legal:  they are legalese.  Most 
importantly, they do not take on the substantive obligations that are of 
the most interest.  For example, they do not say how old workers need to 
be (at what age is child labor objectionable?), how many fire exits are 
required, or from where materials must be sourced.  This minimalist 
strategy is purposeful though controversial.  Primarily, it is practical.  
Standards will necessarily vary by industry.  Apparel manufacturers will 
care about cotton sourcing, while electronics companies will have no 
interest in cotton.  Just as importantly, wide consensus has so far proved 
                                               
THE PROMISE AND LIMITS OF PRIVATE POWER:  PROMOTING LABOR STANDARDS IN A GLOBAL 
ECONOMY 35–39 (2013). 
 5. Julfikar Ali Manik & Jim Yardley, Building Collapse in Bangladesh Leaves Scores 
Dead, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/25/world/asia/ 
bangladesh-building-collapse.html. 
 6. See infra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 7. See generally E. Christopher Johnson, Jr., Business Lawyers Are in a Unique Position to Help 
Their Clients Identify Supply-Chain Risks Involving Labor Trafficking and Child Labor, 70 BUS. LAW. 
1083 (2015) (noting that business lawyers can help their clients identify supply chain risks). 
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impossible.8  But particular parties, or even industries, can reach some 
agreement.  These clauses increase the probability that such an agreement 
will be legally binding and operationally likely.  That is the primary goal. 
Much work has been done already, and it has been crucial, 
groundbreaking work.  The UN Guiding Principles are perhaps best 
known,9 and they have shown a way forward.  There are many other 
efforts, including other principles and policies10 as well as legislative 
and regulatory attempts primarily aimed at human trafficking and 
conflict minerals.11  These efforts involve not only countless trade-offs, but 
                                               
 8. Child labor is illustrative.  At what age is labor objectionable?  Many children 
work; many parents and societies view this work as important to the moral and social 
formation of children.  Work by very young children who should be in school may be 
highly objectionable; a seventeen-year-old child who works on the family farm during 
the summer when school is not in session may not be objectionable.  Where lines are 
to be drawn, and who should draw them, is the subject of considerable debate, even 
within the United States.  See, e.g., Andrew Van Dam, 452 Children Died on the Job in the 
U.S. Between 2003 and 2016, WASH. POST (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost 
.com/business/2018/12/20/child-labor-deaths-us-twenty-first-century (“Child labor 
exists in the United States in the 21st century.  It’s legal and widespread . . . .”).  The 
variation is likely much wider internationally. 
 9. U.N. Office of the High Commissioner, Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights:  Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, 
U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/11/04 (Mar. 21, 2011), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents 
/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf.  For recent guidance on how 
companies can use them, with particular emphasis on the guidance documents from 
the International Bar Association, see John F. Sherman, III, Wise Counselling on Global 
Supply Chains:  The IBA Practical Guide on Business and Human Rights for Business Lawyers, 
BUS. & HUM. RTS. REV. 22 (2017).  Business and human rights is an entire field of study, 
and no effort is made here to review or cite even the leading literature in the field.  
These notes simply highlight some of the key contributions, like the U.N. Guiding 
Principles, and a few articles discussing them.  The cited sources should help lead 
interested readers into the vastness of the literature. 
 10. See, e.g., ABA Model Business and Supplier Policies on Labor Trafficking and Child 
Labor, ABA (Jan. 9, 2019), http://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/init 
iatives_awards/child_labor.  See generally Johnson, supra note 7. 
 11. Consider, for example, Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 
(TFTEA), Pub. L. No. 114-125, 130 Stat. 122 (2016); Trafficking Victims Protection 
Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7112 (2012); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589–1591 (2012); 
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2013 (TVPRA) (Title XII of the 
Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54 
(2013)); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010), § 1502 (conflict minerals); California’s Transparency 
in Supply Chain Act of 2012 (TSCA), CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43 (2012); FAR §§ 52.222-
50–59 (2017); Modern Slavery Act 2015, c. 30 (UK); the French Corporate Duty of 
Vigilance Law, Loi 2017-399 du 27 mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance des 
sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre [Law 2017-399 of March 27, 2017 
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they are riven by a complex of geopolitical and economic interests that 
can hamper their effectiveness.  For these reasons, many of the legislative 
solutions are narrowly limited, and the NGO and soft law projects that 
publish principles for companies to follow not only face similar pressures 
to compromise but are often hortatory, aspirational, or vague.  Between 
the work of the United Nations (UN), quangos, nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), legislatures, and regulators, the rules and tools can 
seem bewildering, if not overwhelming, at least to an outsider.12 
Some of the most direct and effective intervention can come from 
companies themselves, particularly the Western buyers at the top of 
the supply chain.  They see this, and their energies have been extensive 
and generally fall into one or more of three categories.  Most 
prominent has been the adoption of policies, perhaps based on the 
UN Guiding Principles or one of the other projects, that the company 
posts on its website.  These policies are sometimes aspirational and 
sometimes reflect a corporate commitment; the distinction, of course, 
can be legally decisive.13  Sometimes the commitment extends to 
requiring suppliers and others in the supply chain to agree to adhere 
to the corporate “code of conduct” or “ethical business practices.”14  
Often such agreements may be legally required, as when the buyer is 
                                               
on the duty of vigilance of parent companies and contractors], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE 
LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.], Mar. 28, 2017; Directive 2014/95/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 amending Directive 
2013/34/EU as Regards Disclosure of Non-Financial and Diversity Information by 
Certain Large Undertakings and Groups, 2014 O.J. (L 330) 1.  For more on European 
and Australian efforts, see generally Davide Casale, Joint Responsibility of Enterprises for 
the Health and Safety of Their Contractors’ Workers:  Recent Trends in Italian Law, 36 COMP. 
LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 131 (2014); Paul Harpur & Philip James, The Shift in Regulatory Focus 
from Employment to Work Relationships:  Critiquing Reforms to Australian and U.K. 
Occupational Safety and Health Laws, 36 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 111 (2014); Claudia 
Schubert, The Case of AFOA v. Port of Seattle:  A German Point of View, 36 COMP. LAB. L. 
& POL’Y J. 149 (2014); Louise Vytopil, Contractual Control and Labour-Related CSR Norms 
in the Supply Chain:  Dutch Best Practices, 8 UTRECHT L. REV. 155 (2012). 
 12. For a collection, see Radu Mares, The Limits of Supply Chain Responsibility:  A 
Critical Analysis of Corporate Responsibility Instruments, 79 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 193 (2010), 
but the list is not complete.  One additional entry, for example, from Amnesty 
International, is the Human Rights Principles for Companies, ACT 70/01/98 (1998), 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/148000/act700011998en.pdf. 
 13. Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Nat’l Consumers League v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., No. 2015 CA 007731 B, 2016 WL 4080541, at 11 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 
22, 2016) (qualifying language such as “expect,” “goal,” and “ask” shows an aspiration 
rather than a promise or commitment). 
 14. See id. at 2–4, 11; see also Vendor Code of Conduct, ABERCROMBIE & FITCH, 
http://corporate.abercrombie.com/af-cares/sustainability/social/vendor-code-of-conduct. 
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subject to the Federal Acquisition Regulation.15  And sometimes the 
commitment involves a complex of other parties, as where a Western 
buyer joins a standard-setting organization (like the Fair Labor 
Association or the Worker Rights Consortium) and requires its 
suppliers (so-called “first tier suppliers” or colloquially “first-tiers”) and their 
suppliers and subcontractors to join the same organization.  Membership 
in the organization entails a commitment to abide by the organization’s 
principles (e.g., to protect worker health and safety and to guard against 
forced labor) and an agreement to be audited by that organization or its 
agents.16  But these details can await further development below. 
The point for now is more basic.  Behind the MCCs are two stories, a 
seemingly straightforward effort and a wishfully simple hope.  One story 
is notorious:  the tragically repeated human catastrophes that haunt 
international supply chains.  The other story is technocratic, revolving 
around bar association activities and corporate organization.  The MCCs 
that resulted from all of this are an effort to prevent more human loss, to 
exercise corporate power in a morally conscious way, and to be as 
hardheaded and as practical as any good business lawyer. 
A critical part of practicality is an eye to what it takes to get a deal 
closed.  Sometimes closing a deal means skipping the hard part.  Such a 
move is risky, but neither businesses nor business lawyers can live in a 
world without risk.  A term sheet for a business deal will leave much for 
later development and negotiation; the same is true for letters of intent 
and the like.  Complex business arrangements cannot close every hole 
or forecast every possibility.  All contracts are necessarily incomplete.17  
Closing a deal will sometimes mean leaving more holes, or larger ones, 
than either party desires.  But agreement beforehand may be too 
difficult, too costly, or even impossible, and sometimes parties prefer to 
leave the hole and close the deal. 
                                               
 15. FAR §§ 52.222-50–59.  See generally Lyndsey Conrad et al., Mandated Corporate 
Responsibility for Human Trafficking:  New Federal Acquisition Regulation Steps up Supply Chain 
Accountability, 60 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 73, 73–74, 87 (2015).  According to some assessments, the 
codes of conduct are ineffective, or at least insufficiently effective, rendering the companies 
that adopt them out of compliance with public law mandates.  See Debra Cohen Maryanov, 
Comment, Sweatshop Liability:  Corporate Codes of Conduct and the Governance of Labor Standards 
in the International Supply Chain, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 397 (2010). 
 16. See generally MARTIN DAVIES & DAVID V. SNYDER, INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS IN 
GOODS:  GLOBAL SALES IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT 236–43 (2014). 
 17. E.g., Richard R.W. Brooks, The Efficient Performance Hypothesis, 116 YALE L.J. 568, 587 n.43 
(2006) (“[C]ontracts are necessarily incomplete, even when written by sophisticated parties.”). 
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That has been part of the strategy of the MCCs, and there are two 
obvious roads that have not (yet) been taken.  Most obviously, as 
mentioned earlier, the MCCs do not set the human rights standards that 
will apply to suppliers.  Similarly, they do not set standards for buyers 
(even though many would argue that buyers’ demands for low cost and 
quick production are a significant cause of the problems).  The reasons 
have been sketched already and will receive fuller attention below.  In 
short, the MCCs do not attempt to solve all of the problems in supply 
chains; their aim is simply to be part of a necessarily multifaceted solution. 
Less obviously and perhaps more interestingly, the MCCs do not 
seek to set up an elaborate structure of governance for the supply chain 
relationship.  Such structures have generated serious interest from 
political scientists and political theorists, and practically speaking, they 
may be the most promising road to greater success in making 
improvements on the ground.  Such efforts are much more ambitious 
than the current version of the MCCs, but if there were to be an effort 
for Model Contract Clauses 2.0, this road deserves further exploration.  
These issues receive more attention below.18 
I.    THE PROBLEMS TO BE ADDRESSED BY THE 
 MODEL CONTRACT CLAUSES 
Identifying the problems to be addressed is often a productive starting 
point.  There are several, and they will be described shortly.  Since the 
MCCs were drafted with a lawyerly, problem-solving, fact-based attitude, 
sketching a paradigmatic supply chain setup will be a useful first step.  Then 
the problems can be more easily identified, separated, and understood. 
A.   A Supply Chain Paradigm for Human Rights Protections 
This paradigm is simplified and stylized, as paradigms necessarily 
are.  It is based on some research19 and some experience, but I cannot 
                                               
 18. See infra Section III.B. 
 19. Perhaps the leading study on protecting workers in international supply chains 
is by LOCKE, supra note 4.  Numerous other works are cited elsewhere in this Article.  
Information can also be gathered from case studies such as Christopher A. Bartlett et 
al., IKEA’s Global Sourcing Challenge:  Indian Rugs and Child Labor (B), HARV. BUS. SCH., 
No. 9-906-415 (rev. Nov. 14, 2006); Dana Brown & Jette Steen Knudsen, Trip Trap:  
Managing Certification in the Global Supply Chain, RICHARD IVEY SCH. OF BUS. FOUND., No. 
W14528 (Oct. 24, 2014); Monali Malvankar, Nokia India:  Battery Recall Logistics, 
RICHARD IVEY SCH. OF BUS. FOUND., No. W11082 (May 4, 2011).  But these are only 
tastes:  the management and study of supply chains is its own discipline—universities 
offer degrees in the subject—and this Article cannot attempt a canvas of the literature.  
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claim that it is an empirically based model, which would have to be the 
subject of a different paper.  If empirical investigation reveals 
significantly different paradigms, then some of the thinking may need 
to be revisited.  In essence, the purpose of this section is to explain the 
assumptions so that as assumptions are questioned, relaxed or 
expanded, the strategies and arguments can be refined or revised. 
Here, then, is the paradigm.  Western Company20 sells goods in 
consumer markets in the developed world, primarily in the United 
States but also in Europe and elsewhere.  Western Company is large 
and well known, and its brand is valuable.  Western Company is 
organized so that it has a purchasing department, an operations 
department, a product development department, and a marketing 
department.  These are the business departments.  It also has a general 
counsel’s office; an office devoted to social responsibility (CSR 
office),21 which may have titles and responsibilities related to 
environmental sustainability, diversity, ethics, and the like; as well as 
other departments.  Contracts, compliance, and legal policies are the 
province of the general counsel’s office.  The contracts are drafted and 
reviewed by the general counsel’s office.  The business departments 
develop products, decide production and marketing timeframes, 
acceptable costs of production and sales, and they consider who can 
make the products.  Much of the contract negotiation is done by the 
business departments, often without much involvement from the 
general counsel’s office, which will only be involved in large 
negotiations and which will briefly review the resulting contract for 
compliance with the law and company policies.  Those policies may be 
                                               
Aside from the many works of Locke, interested readers will find that Dara O’Rourke 
and Abraham Ringer, infra note 26, as well as GARY GEREFFI (most recently his GLOBAL 
VALUE CHAINS AND DEVELOPMENT:  REDEFINING THE CONTOURS OF 21ST CENTURY 
CAPITALISM (2018)) offer entry into the literature.  Readers interested in more 
theoretical considerations might start with IGLP Law & Global Production Working 
Group, The Role of Law in Global Value Chains:  A Research Manifesto, 4 LONDON REV. INT’L 
L. 57 (2016) [hereinafter Manifesto]; Klaas Hendrik Eller, Private Governance of Global 
Value Chains from Within:  Lessons from and for Transnational Law, 8 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL 
THEORY 296 (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/20414005.2017.1307310.  Both offer 
citations to recent literature and the former also surveys current research projects. 
 20. This name is chosen because it is descriptive.  The hypothetical company in 
the paradigm has no relation to The Western Company, a western-wear retailer in 
Denver, or to any other real company.  Some literature might prefer to call it the 
Northern Company (as opposed to the workers in the Global South—not to be 
confused with the southern United States). 
 21. I will call it the CSR office, although that is an unlikely name for it. 
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related to labor practices, anticorruption, transparency, quality 
control, product reliability, and the like.  The CSR office may be 
involved in assuring that the chosen contracting counterparty will 
comply with, and does not raise any red flags with respect to, Western 
Company’s policies on responsible business practices. 
The counterparty in the contract that Western Company signs is First 
Tier Supplier (FTS).  FTS may make some components of Western 
Company products itself, but subcontractors of FTS will perform much 
if not all of the manufacturing.  At a minimum, then, the supply chain 
will consist of Western Company at the top, FTS in the middle, and 
subcontractors at the bottom.  Quite possibly there will be more layers, 
but this description will suffice for the paradigm.  To engage FTS, Western 
Company will sometimes use an agent or broker.22  Sometimes, though, 
an FTS will itself function like an agent or broker.  In these situations the 
primary job for FTS is to find others to do the work.  FTS in such cases, in 
purely economic terms, may simply take a cut, i.e., a percentage of the 
sales, although the formal legal and accounting arrangements may call 
for a sale from subcontractors to FTS and a further sale by FTS to Western 
Company.  Much if not all of the manufacturing will take place in 
developing countries distantly removed from the principal place of 
business and primary markets of Western Company. 
Once the contract is signed, there are two salient pressures for the 
purposes of this Article:  keeping costs low and production fast.  The 
consumer market moves quickly, not only in the most obvious 
industries like fashion, which is characterized by its constantly 
changing styles, but in other industries like sporting goods and 
electronics.  Partly these pressures are tied to fashions (even outside 
the fashion industry) and changing consumer tastes and demands, but 
much of it is purposeful revenue generation:  increasing revenue requires 
increasing sales, and increasing sales is aided by introducing new products 
to sell.  Put simply, a smartphone company is anxious for everyone to want 
a new model as soon as possible, even if the smartphone everyone has 
works perfectly well.  And most obviously, lowering costs of production 
increases profits, and lowering labor costs is a key component of this 
strategy.  The pressure on the supply chain that comes from cost control 
is obvious.  What may be less apparent, but also important, are the 
problems that come from time pressure.  Bringing new products to 
                                               
 22. See, e.g., Filanto S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int’l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229, 1230 
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (involving a contract between a New York firm and an Italian 
manufacturer secured through the firm’s foreign agent in the United Kingdom). 
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market quickly can easily lead to excessive work hours, exploitation of 
transient workers, or cheating on supply chain commitments.23 
Operational aspects of the paradigm are also relevant.  There are 
workers on the factory floor.  They will receive instructions either orally 
or in writing from a supervisor.  They need to be told, in other words, 
what to do:  what to sew and how many; how many containers to fill 
and of what sizes; in short, how to fulfill the contract for the production 
of goods.  The supervisors will receive this information in writing 
(electronically or perhaps on paper) to pass along to the workers.  The 
supervisors will also need this information to manage scheduling, 
production timing, quality control, and countless other manufacturing 
tasks.  In the paradigm, much of this information appears not in the 
main body of the contract—the legalese—but in a schedule attached 
to a contract, or a purchase order issued under a master agreement—
for example, a master vendor agreement—or the like.  Operations 
personnel will not be looking at representations, warranties, and 
merger clauses; they will be looking at a schedule or appendix that is 
only referred to in the legalese.  Other operationally important matters 
are also stated elsewhere, like the steps that Western Company expects 
FTS and subcontractors to take to protect Western Company’s 
intellectual property.  These schedules or appendixes or purchase 
orders, in short, tell the production staff at FTS or its subcontractors 
what to do, perhaps how to do it, and also what will be checked or 
monitored or audited (e.g., the production run will be monitored for 
quantity and quality; IP safeguards may be checked or audited; and so on). 
Moving away from operations and back to corporate headquarters, 
the paradigm includes the realities of corporate politics.  For the most 
part, the company is managed from the C Suite, senior or executive 
vice presidents for operations, for marketing, and so on, and is run by 
the people who report directly to the people in the C Suite offices.  The 
general counsel sits in the C Suite but does not have quite as much to do 
with the core business of the company—developing products, producing 
them, selling them.  Nevertheless, the general counsel and the CEO sit on 
the board of directors or are at least present at the board meetings. 
The chief officer in charge of CSR, like the general counsel, may 
have a hand in various operational aspects of the company, particularly 
relating to labor, due diligence, reporting, and marketing.  Like the 
general counsel, the CSR chief is a bit of an afterthought for the 
business people—not in the literal sense of being sought out afterwards, 
                                               
 23. See LOCKE, supra note 4, ch. 6. 
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although that is often true with respect to the general counsel—but is 
viewed as an extra step in the process.  CSR is a supernumerary 
department or an extra person who must be permitted on the team. 
The overall performance of the company and the executive officers 
are overseen by the board, and large matters of policy are the province 
of the board.  The board does little or nothing that is not at the behest 
of the CEO, however.  The board may adopt a policy, for instance, but 
it may or may not be put into everyday practice.  What happens in the 
operations of the company is up to management, not the board. 
In this paradigm there is another set of players:  NGOs who will 
mount an outcry and advocate for negative consequences for Western 
Company if it misbehaves.  The NGOs will do a bit of monitoring and 
will “name and shame” companies for misbehavior; they may also try 
to help companies build new capabilities for protecting workers.  The 
NGO outcry will be at its most strident not when monitoring reveals lapses 
but when something terrible happens.  The NGOs will also launch 
lawsuits against offending companies24 and will seek negative publicity 
against them.  The NGOs will also advocate for Western Company to 
adopt different practices and will issue reports on which companies follow 
preferred policies, which do not, and which companies are the best and 
worst.25  The preferred policies will vary depending on the NGO. 
The paradigm just described underlies the thinking in this Article, 
but there are variations.  In some, the link to the consumer market may 
be weak, invisible, or nonexistent.  This will have several implications.  
First, there is not likely to be nearly the same level of consumer 
consternation and market effect if there turn out to be problems with, 
say, the steel production for oceangoing cargo vessels, or the 
manufacturing of rail presses used by heavy-truck manufacturers, and 
so on.  Similarly, the NGOs may have trouble gaining as much traction 
in their efforts, and either for that reason or others may have less 
interest in devoting energy and money into monitoring, reporting, and 
                                               
 24. E.g., Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Nat’l Consumers League v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., No. 2015 CA 007731 B, 2016 WL 4080541 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 22, 2016). 
 25. For further information on the empirical and theoretical bases for the part of 
the paradigm described in this paragraph, see generally THE POLITICS OF LEVERAGE IN 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:  NAME, SHAME, AND SANCTION 32-102 (H. Richard Friman 
ed., 2015), particularly the chapters on Revisiting Human Rights Naming and Shaming.  
See e.g., ESBENSHADE, supra note 3, at 10–12, 52–58 (on the role of civil society and 
NGOs in monitoring sweatshops and exerting pressure); LOCKE, supra note 4, ch. 4; 
Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Sticks and Stones:  Naming and Shaming the Human Rights 
Enforcement Problem, 62 INT’L ORG. 689 (2008). 
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the like.  Also, whatever effect consumer demand has on the 
production of untainted goods may play differently in the market for 
rail presses than in the market for chocolate.26 
Regardless of the variation in the paradigm—whether it involves a 
consumer market or not—one assumption made here is that the 
leadership of Western Company wants to “do the right thing.”  
Operating in the real world as it does, Western Company faces 
constraints on achieving the ideal.  The executives know that they will 
not reach the ideal and that their version of the “right thing” might 
differ from the NGOs’. But they would like to do their best, and they 
are willing to incur costs to do so, with the understanding that their 
best also includes considering the financial health of the company, 
which means taking into account revenues and time-to-market 
measures, costs, profits, shareholders, domestic employees, and others.  
It also means taking into account the reputation of the company, 
which—particularly in the consumer-market version of the 
paradigm—aligns with their desire to do the right thing. 
This alignment is not perfect:  protecting the reputation of the 
company, keeping it compliant with a variety of laws and regulations 
that apply differently and variously around Western’s global 
operations, and doing the right thing will induce a number of the 
decisionmakers to assign these tasks to particular departments, the key 
one of which is the CSR department, and another one of which is the 
general counsel’s office.  This division of labor allows some executives 
                                               
 26. The wording here is deliberate.  There is some indication that consumer 
demand for untainted goods will help clean up supply chains.  See, e.g., Laura Enax et 
al., Effects of Social Sustainability Signaling on Neural Valuation Signals and Taste-Experience 
of Food Products, 9 FRONTIERS IN BEHAV. NEUROSCIENCE 1 (2015), https://www.frontier 
sin.org/articles/10.3389/fnbeh.2015.00247/full (chocolate experiment); Jens 
Hainmueller et al., Consumer Demand for Fair Trade:  Evidence from a Multistore Field 
Experiment, 97 REV. ECON. & STAT. 242 (2015) (coffee experiment); Howard Kimeldorf 
et al., Consumers with a Conscience:  Will They Pay More?, 5 CONTEXTS 24 (2006) (sock 
study).  Even these cautiously optimistic studies, however, report results that must be 
qualified by limits on how much more consumers are willing to spend and particularly 
by consumers’ limited capacity to take in information, as was made clear by the sock 
study.  See Kimeldorf et al., supra, at 26–28.  Other studies are even less optimistic.  
Adam S. Chilton & Galit A. Sarfaty, The Limitations of Supply Chain Disclosure Regimes, 53 
STAN. J. INT’L L. 1 (2017).  For an assessment on the environmental side, see Dara 
O’Rourke & Abraham Ringer, The Impact of Sustainability Information on Consumer 
Decision Making, 20 J. INDUS. ECOLOGY 882 (2015) (arguing that “providing more or 
better information on sustainability issues will likely have limited impact on changing 
mainstream consumer behavior unless it is designed to connect into existing decision-
making processes”), and more generally, DARA O’ROURKE, SHOPPING FOR GOOD (2012). 
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and departments to leave human rights concerns to others.  Moreover, 
reputation can be protected through marketing efforts in addition to 
and to some degree instead of substantive remediation.  The NGOs 
and some consumers are often quite worried about this “whitewashing” 
phenomenon.27  They will be worried that the attractive, glossy efforts 
of the marketing department will sufficiently obscure supply chain 
problems so that Western Company will ignore the issue.28  The 
company, in short, may enjoy something close to the magical 
invisibility that enables the company to do wrong with impunity.29 
Finally, and crucially, the paradigm assumes that regulation is increasing, 
but that it remains primarily if not exclusively limited to regimes of disclosure, 
due diligence, or both.  Widespread international imposition of liability for 
injuries in the supply chain—whether such a regime is desirable or not—is 
presumed to be highly unlikely in the foreseeable future.30 
   
                                               
 27. Medea Benjamin, Foreword to ARCHON FUNG ET AL., CAN WE PUT AN END TO 
SWEATSHOPS? ix (2001) (“[T]he real battle was over how to ensure that the company’s 
code was not just a lofty document on a piece of paper but something that had 
meaning on the ground.”).  Salminen argues that even enforceable contractual 
liability against Western buyers allows “whitewashing.”  Jaakko Salminen, The Accord on 
Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh:  A New Paradigm for Limiting Buyers’ Liability in 
Global Supply Chains?, 66 AM. J. COMP. L. 411, 412 (2018).  I am keenly aware that similar 
arguments may be leveled against the MCCs.  See Sarah Dadush, Contracting for Human Rights:  
Looking to Version 2.0 of the ABA Model Contract Clauses, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 1519, 1534–45 (2019). 
 28. Concerns are not limited to marketing.  ESBENSHADE, supra note 3, at 11, argues 
that even monitoring production and auditing supply chains are methods used by 
companies “primarily to avoid bad publicity and to address consumer concerns.” 
 29. This problem is one impetus for the social contract:  Plato suggests the idea 
(in Glaucon’s argument) that a person will prefer to do injustice as long as he will not 
be punished, as would be the case if he had a magical ring that could make him 
invisible while engaging in wrongdoing.  In this sense, the fear is that marketing and 
public relations give Western Company something like this magical ring.  In short, PR is 
the corporate ring of Gyges.  See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC bk. II, 359a–360d, in THE REPUBLIC 
OF PLATO 37–38 (Allan Bloom trans., 2d ed. 1968). (Current readers can conceive of the 
ring of Gyges as being much the same as Harry Potter’s cloak of invisibility).  The 
conventional agreement to law and contracts to achieve justice is a compromise to avoid 
the undesirable results of accommodating everyone’s presumed desire to do as much 
injustice as possible.  These matters are taken up infra in Section II.A. 
 30. Imposition of supply chain liability remains quite limited.  The law in France, see 
supra note 11, is perhaps the most prominent, although perhaps not the most ambitious.  
Consider the project of Bair, Jackson & Rogers mentioned in Manifesto, supra note 19, at 76. 
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B.   Making Human Rights Protections Legally Effective  
and Operationally Likely 
With the paradigms in mind, the problems emerge.  There are 
several.  First and most important, workers are suffering and sometimes 
dying as they work to produce the goods so enjoyed and so expected 
by the prosperous.  On this there is general agreement, but the 
agreement ends when the conversation becomes more specific, and 
this is the second problem:  consensus on meaningful standards is 
difficult or impossible to achieve.  One of the chief problems for 
lawyers to solve is this lack of consensus; the law is no stranger to 
moving forward despite a lack of complete agreement.31  Another 
problem may be a lack of consensus within a particular corporate 
context, but the issue may be more a matter of organization and 
emphasis than any active disagreement.  Still, the corporate politics 
may need some careful navigation—hence the attention to 
management organization in the paradigm.  That work will include an 
eye to operations so that corporate policies are not merely nice window 
dressing on the corporate website but have some chance at being put 
into practice (“operationalized,” in the parlance). 
Additionally, and not least, the clauses necessary to make the 
protections legally effective are extremely difficult to draft from a 
doctrinal standpoint.  This difficulty results mainly from the focus of 
commercial law on the goods to be produced rather than the 
conditions of production.32  That focus, in turn, leads to difficulty with 
respect to remedies33 that are geared to workers’ human rights, health, 
and safety rather than monetary compensation for defective goods. 
                                               
 31. “[C]ontracts are necessarily incomplete.”  Brooks, supra note 17, at 587 n.43.  
Even during the most formalistic period, although it required agreement on the same 
thing (consensus ad idem), e.g., Raffles v. Wichelhaus (1864), 159 Eng. Rep. 375, 375–
76 (Peerless Case), the common law did not insist on agreement on every possible 
detail, which would have been impossible in any case.  Further, what agreement there 
is may be worthwhile even though it is incompletely theorized and even though the 
parties’ reasons may in fact diverge.  See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, 
Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1737–38 (1995). 
 32. This issue explains the extensive attention to representations and warranties 
and their relation to the goods themselves in the Model Contract Clauses, supra note 2, 
¶¶ 1–2.  Most importantly, breach of the obligations with respect to workers makes the 
goods themselves nonconforming under the MCCs.  See id. ¶¶ 2.2 (rejection of goods), 
3.1 (buyer’s revocation of acceptance) & 1099 n.29 (defining nonconforming goods). 
 33. See Jennifer S. Martin’s contribution to this symposium, Private Law Remedies, 
Human Rights, and Supply Contracts, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 1781(2019). 
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In sum, there are multiple problems to be solved:  (1) improving the 
conditions for workers; (2) crafting agreements in the absence of 
consensus; (3) drafting contractual language despite doctrinal gaps 
created by a mismatch in focus; (4) finding productive paths through 
the corporate political landscape; and (5) making corporate policies 
operational instead of aspirational, and certainly not mere window 
dressing.  Each of these problems is addressed below. 
1. Protecting the human rights, health, and safety of workers, and the problem 
of moral luck 
At first it may seem that not much argument would be necessary on 
this score, but three points are worth making.  The first is easiest 
because it is obvious—too often supply chains are plagued by forced 
labor, child labor, or unsafe working conditions.  Sometimes the 
situation reaches sufficiently horrific levels to draw headlines in 
Western media.  The second point is that current efforts are 
insufficiently effective.  The problem is partly due to measures being 
ignored too often, either because some companies do not have them 
or because other companies have them but do too little to make them 
effective.  And interestingly, but perhaps controversially, there is an 
argument (advanced most forcefully by Provost Richard Locke) that 
the kind of measures represented by the MCCs are doomed to tragic 
insufficiency because private efforts cannot achieve the goal without 
public legal reinforcement.34 
First, the worst (but easiest) part:  this Article began with the factory 
fire that killed over 100 and the building collapse that killed over 1000, 
just a few years ago and within easy memory.35  A sizeable literature 
documents and considers abuses and tragedies in domestic and 
international supply chains.36  The good news on the bad news is that 
                                               
 34. LOCKE, supra note 4, at 17 (authoritative rulemaking, as from a state, 
required to solve collective action problems), 18 (“‘[E]nabling rights’ . . . can be 
brought to life” only by law), passim. 
 35. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text. 
 36. See, e.g., GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW:  THE WORLD’S OTHER ECONOMY (Gordon 
Mathews et al. eds., 2012); LAURA HAPKE, SWEATSHOP:  THE HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN 
IDEA (2004); ROBERT J.S. ROSS, SLAVES TO FASHION:  POVERTY AND ABUSE IN THE NEW 
SWEATSHOPS (2004); FUNG ET AL., supra note 27.  Additional examples of recent 
allegations include Annie Kelly, Nestlé Admits Slavery in Thailand While Fighting Child 
Labour Lawsuit in Ivory Coast, GUARDIAN (Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
sustainable-business/2016/feb/01/nestle-slavery-thailand-fighting-child-labour-lawsu 
it-ivory-coast (presenting Nestlé’s instances of forced labor within its supply chains); 
Daniela Penha, Slave Labor Found at Starbucks-Certified Brazil Coffee Plantation, MONGABAY 
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it makes the news, and thus makes the importance of the issue clear.  
In the terms of cognitive biases and behavioral economics, the 
information becomes more “available.”37  In this sense it is too bad that 
problems do not make the front page more often (although of course 
no one wishes for any more tragedies). 
Steps taken so far, then, are inadequate.  The problem does not arise 
for absence of effort; perhaps there is not enough effort, or perhaps 
the efforts are insufficiently effective.  One of the most salient points 
of the factory fire and building collapse was that the particular issues 
in the buildings were not unknown.  Nor was the knowledge merely 
general, along the lines of, “Oh, yes, there are always issues in those 
places.”  Recent inspections had discovered the problems in the 
particular places where the deaths occurred, and the inspections had 
found the specific problems—a lack of fire exits in the case of the 
factory fire and structural flaws in the case of the building collapse.38  
Again, this seems like good news and bad news:  the problem of 
knowledge has been solved, at least in these cases.  The problem of 
remediation, however, has not. 
Provost Locke’s work argues that a complementary public-private 
structure will in any case be necessary to achieve optimal labor 
protections.39  The point is intuitive:  if public and private players work in 
complementary ways on the same problem, presumably the solving power 
is at its greatest.40  Some scenarios might be imagined where the public and 
                                               
(Sept. 18, 2018), https://news.mongabay.com/2018/09/slave-labor-found-at-
starbucks-certified-brazil-coffee-plantation (finding slave labor in a Starbucks coffee 
bean supplier); Michael Sainato, Accidents at Amazon:  Workers Left to Suffer After 
Warehouse Injuries, GUARDIAN (July 18, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian. 
com/technology/2018/jul/30/accidents-at-amazon-workers-left-to-suffer-after-wareh 
ouse-injuries (revealing numerous instances of workplace injuries in Amazon’s 
factories); Martje Theuws & Pauline Overeem, Flawed Fabrics:  The Abuse of Girls and 
Women Workers in the South Indian Textile Industry, SOMO CTR. RES. MULTINATIONAL 
CORPS. 17–30 (2014), http://www.indianet.nl/pdf/FlawedFabrics.pdf (reporting on 
women’s labor conditions in five spinning mills:  Best Cotton Mills, Jeyavishnu Spintex, 
Premier Mills, Sulochana Cotton Spinning Mills, and Super Spinning Mills). 
 37. E.g., DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 129–30 (2011). 
 38. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text. 
 39. LOCKE, supra note 4, at 12–22 & ch. 7; see also Thomas A. Hemphill & George 
O. White III, The World Economic Forum and Nike:  Emerging ‘Shared Responsibility’ and 
Institutional Control Models for Achieving a Socially Responsible Global Supply Chain?, 1 BUS. 
& HUM. RTS. J. 307, 308 (2016). 
 40. This seems to be much the same point as Justice Jackson’s famous concurrence 
in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
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private actors work counterproductively, but this seems unlikely, and 
Provost Locke’s research suggests that the intuition is borne out 
empirically.  In the electronics industry, where private efforts are combined 
with public ones, the results are better.41  Further, this may not be simply a 
matter of better results stemming from more and varied institutional 
players working in the same direction.  Crucial to understanding Provost 
Locke’s argument is the idea that only an authoritative rulemaker can 
resolve collective action problems and conflicts of interest.42 
This conclusion seems well worth noticing even if at first there is 
little that the business lawyer or the supply contract can do about it.  
Although a private effort alone is disparaged as second best,43 the claim 
does not seem to be that private efforts should not be made.  The 
argument made by Provost Locke, many NGOs, and labor advocates is 
simply that public efforts are also necessary and should not be 
discouraged.  Indeed, many NGOs have devoted themselves to 
advocating for private supply chain management to promote labor 
rights, human rights, and the like, both in the traditional manner 
contemplated by the MCCs and in newer, “capability building” 
initiatives.44  Assuming this argument is correct—that private efforts 
alone will achieve less human rights protections than combined private 
and public ones—then only so much can be hoped for.  Still, second 
best is better than nothing, and may be quite a lot better than nothing, 
particularly once the goals are considered clearly. 
Moreover, remember that Provost Locke, other labor-oriented 
scholars, the International Labour Organisation, and many NGOs share 
goals (like unionization) that companies like Western Company may not 
fully support.45  Further, Western Company has a number of other goals 
                                               
concurring) (federal power is at its greatest when the President and Congress act in 
concert, and less when they do not, particularly when they act in opposition). 
 41. LOCKE, supra note 4, ch. 7. 
 42. E.g., id. at 12, 17. 
 43. Id. at 9. 
 44. See MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS:  
ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998); GAY W. SEIDMAN, BEYOND THE 
BOYCOTT:  LABOR RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM (2007); LOCKE, 
supra note 4, at 11, ch. 4. 
 45. ESBENSHADE, supra note 3, at 12 (“[P]romote workers’ organizing . . . .”); 
LOCKE, supra note 4, at 18, 21; ROSS, supra note 36, ch. 9.  This Article does not mean 
to argue against unionization, but it does recognize the issue as contested in an 
international context.  For instance, unionization rights and collective bargaining are 
recognized and protected by the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 151–169.  Id. at 78.  Internationally, the situation is less clear.  Unionization is 
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that must be met.  So two observations are necessary.  First, strategies like 
those in the MCCs can only achieve so much, but they still seem worth 
pursuing.  Second, these criticisms point to next steps that may be more 
productive.  They may lead, in other words, to Model Contract Clauses 2.0. 
There is a different problem with respect to worker health and 
safety.  Leaving aside the more controversial issues (meaning that 
consensus will be difficult or impossible to achieve) like unionization, 
the issue of worker health and safety often seems to get less attention—
especially compared to forced labor—despite its obvious importance.  
The evil of forced labor should not be minimized, but surely it is at least 
as bad for workers to be crushed to death in a building collapse or to be 
immolated in a factory fire.  Aside from that horrific point, certainly it 
does not escape notice that when such events occur, they make front page 
news and lead to the outcries and boycotts that could (in theory) decimate 
Western Company’s bottom line.  So why is it that worker health and safety 
seem to get slighted in comparison to forced labor policies? 
At first this (apparent) phenomenon is puzzling, and observers of 
Western Company’s supply chain management practices may question 
whether the observation is correct.  But there are reasons.  First, in 
terms of the legal and compliance practice within Western Company, 
forced labor, human trafficking, and child labor are the subject of 
numerous laws and regulations that bind Western Company directly.46  
Violations could lead to civil47 and potentially criminal liability for 
Western Company, depending on various detailed facts of what 
happened and how, as well as the seizure of its products by federal 
agents.48  Even under laws that require disclosure of supply chain 
practices rather than prohibiting certain practices,49 child labor, 
                                               
protected by article 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but that is a 
nonbinding instrument.  And while the right is also protected by article 8 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the United States 
has not ratified that instrument. 
 46. See, e.g., Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7112 
(2012); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589–1592 (2012) (criminal sanctions for forced labor, 
trafficking, and peonage); Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2013 
(TVPRA) (Title XII of the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. 
L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54 (2013)). 
 47. The first private cause of action under the TVPRA was settled recently.  See 
Stipulation of Dismissal, Sorihin v. Nguyen, No. 16-5422 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2018). 
 48. Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (TFTEA), Pub. L. No. 
114-125, 130 Stat. 122 (2016). 
 49. E.g., California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010 (TSCA), CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 1714.43 (West 2010) (effective Jan. 1, 2012). 
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forced labor, or trafficking could easily result in liability for Western 
Company itself as it is unlikely to have made any required disclosures 
about such practices in its supply chain.50  Since Western Company is 
large and has global reach, the laws under which it will find itself in 
deep trouble are nearly innumerable.51  Small wonder that Western 
Company pays close attention to these matters.  Western Company also 
pays close attention to conflict minerals because of the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission rule on such matters.52  Energy is also 
focused on what the law of the European Union requires with respect 
to conflict minerals.53  In other words, and entirely predictably, the 
attention of Western Company is focused on legal compliance 
requirements that apply directly to it. 
While this explains why the general counsel of Western Company is 
concerned with forced labor, child labor, human trafficking, and to a 
degree, conflict minerals, the question remains as to why worker health 
and safety seem to receive less concentrated attention.  Perhaps the 
answer has two parts.  First, Western Company is not itself bound by 
                                               
 50. See, e.g., id. (outlining retailers’ duty to disclose efforts to eradicate slavery and 
human trafficking from direct supply chain for tangible goods). 
 51. See, e.g., Modern Slavery Act 2015, c. 30 (UK); French Corporate Duty of 
Vigilance Law, Loi 2017-399 du 27 mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance des 
sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre [Law 2017-399 of March 27, 2017 
on the duty of vigilence of parent companies and contractors], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE 
LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.], Mar. 28, 2017; Directive 2014/95/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 amending Directive 
2013/34/EU as Regards Disclosure of Non-Financial and Diversity Information by 
Certain Large Undertakings and Groups, 2014 O.J. (L 330) 1. 
 52. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13p-1 (2018).  Part of the rule was held unconstitutional.  
See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (invalidating the rule 
on the grounds that it violated the First Amendment to the extent it required entities 
to report to the Commission and to state on their websites that any of their products 
have “not been found to be ‘DRC conflict free’”).  Other parts remain in force in at 
least some sense, Keith F. Higgins, Statement on the Effect of the Recent Court of Appeals 
Decision on the Conflict Minerals Rule, SEC (Apr. 29, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/news/ 
public-statement/2014-spch042914kfh, although the public statement of Acting 
Chairman Michael S. Piwowar says that “it is difficult to conceive of a circumstance that 
would counsel in favor of [the SEC] enforcing” the U.S. conflict minerals rules.  
Michael S. Piwowar, Statement of Acting Chairman Piwowar on the Court of Appeals Decision 
on the Conflict Minerals Rule, SEC (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-
statement/piwowar-statement-court-decision-conflict-minerals-rule.  
 53. See generally Enrico Partiti & Steffan Van der Velde, Curbing Supply-Chain Human 
Rights Violations Through Trade and Due Diligence.  Possible WTO Concerns Raised by the EU 
Conflict Minerals Regulation, 51 J. WORLD TRADE 1043 (2017) (assessing the EU 
regulatory strategy for supply chain due diligence obligations and provisions of WTO 
law regarding minerals regulation). 
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laws relating to worker health and safety.  The workers are employees 
of the subcontractors of FTS, or perhaps FTS itself, but they are not 
employees of Western Company.  Further, they are subject to health 
and safety laws in a faraway country.54  Assuming that there are 
violations, then, they are violations of laws of a different jurisdiction 
from Western Company, and those laws apply to different companies 
(i.e., FTS or subcontractors, but not Western Company).  In short, 
violations of those laws do not subject Western Company to liability, at 
least not in any obvious way, and certainly they are little threat 
compared to violations of U.S. laws that apply expressly to Western 
Company.55  This is a practical as well as a legal explanation for why 
worker health and safety may receive less attention at Western 
Company.  Western Company has no compliance obligation itself. 
There is another reason too, which is practical and moral rather 
than practical and legal.  Much regulation of worker health and safety 
requires measures that, with luck, will never be put to use.  For 
instance, adequate and unlocked fire exits are necessary only if there 
is a fire (to state the matter simply).  As long as there is no urgent need 
to evacuate, ordinary exits are perfectly adequate.  In other words, they 
function like insurance functions:  one only “needs” fire insurance if 
there is a fire.  To be sure, not all regulation of worker health and safety 
works this way:  some violations are likely to cause serious and 
immediate harm (e.g., exposure to dangerous glues or other toxic 
chemicals), and violating those regulations would be an evil in itself, 
or malum in se to use the formulation of the criminal law.  Something 
like fire exits, however, is subject to the vagaries of moral luck.  As long 
as there is no fire, everything is fine (sort of), and Western Company 
has not done anything terrible. 
To understand the concept of moral luck better,56 consider an 
example.  If I leave the baby in the bath with the water running to fetch 
                                               
 54. Most often supply chain contracts simply require subcontractors to obey local 
law.  See LOCKE, supra note 4, at 19. 
 55. For a more detailed and nuanced consideration of potential liability, see 
Ramona L. Lampley’s contribution to this symposium, Mitigating Risk, Eradicating 
Slavery, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 1707 (2019).  
 56. For the basic ideas, see generally THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS ch. 3 
(1979); Thomas Nagel, Moral Luck, in MORAL LUCK 57 (Daniel Statman ed., 1993); 
BERNARD WILLIAMS, MORAL LUCK (1981); Bernard Williams, Moral Luck, in MORAL LUCK 
35 (Daniel Statman ed., 1993); Bernard Williams, Postscript, in MORAL LUCK 251 (Daniel 
Statman ed., 1993).  For a consideration in legal contexts, see generally John C.P. 
Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law and Moral Luck, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1123 
(2007); Tony Honoré, Responsibility and Luck:  The Moral Basis of Strict Liability, 104 LAW 
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a toy downstairs, and then I become distracted while the tub fills, and 
the baby drowns, I have done something terrible.  I have not murdered 
my child, but I have killed her, and I will bear the moral responsibility for 
having caused her death by my negligence (at least).  On the other hand, 
if the baby is perfectly fine and is sitting happily in the bathwater when I 
am struck by my error and run, panic stricken, up the stairs, then I have 
been careless, but I have not done anything terrible.  I have not killed my 
child.  At least so it would seem,57 and this is often our experience. 
To translate this idea and experience to the supply chain context:  if 
Western Company traffics in persons, it is committing evil practices, 
and the same is arguably true if the trafficking is performed by 
subcontractors in the supply chain.  (The latter situation will receive 
more attention below, as there are a variety of issues, like remoteness, 
causation, and knowledge or intent, that make the moral situation less 
clear.)  Trafficking is not subject to moral luck.  If Western Company 
does not provide adequate unlocked fire exits, and there is no need 
for them as things turn out, the moral situation is less clear because 
Western Company has been morally lucky.  The concept of moral luck 
is the philosophical equivalent of “no harm, no foul.” 
For many reasons, then, Western Company may be less concerned 
with worker health and safety than with trafficking.  Cognitive biases, 
and particularly the availability of information coupled with an 
optimism bias, may reinforce this.58  Likely thinking goes like this: 
“While there have been factory fires and building collapses in 
Bangladesh, and in New York a century ago,59 those are distant and 
unlikely events.  They will not happen with our subcontractors in 
Thailand or Costa Rica (or wherever).  We need to be attentive, and duly 
diligent, of course—but trafficking is an issue that everyone is talking 
                                               
Q. REV. 530 (1988).  For a consideration of the ideas in the context of contract law, see 
Aditi Bagchi, Managing Moral Risk:  The Case of Contract, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1878 (2011). 
 57. As should now be apparent, how to assess my moral standing with 
philosophical rigor in these two situations is a problem.  Should my moral standing 
really be so different because I have been lucky or unlucky?  In addition to Nagel and 
the sources just cited, consider, for example, NICHOLAS RESCHER, Moral Luck, in 
Statman, supra note 56, at 141; Brynmor Browne, A Solution to the Problem of Moral Luck, 
42 PHIL. Q. 345, 351 (1992); Margaret Urban Walker, Moral Luck and the Virtues of 
Impure Agency, 22 METAPHILOSOPHY 14 (1991).  But there is little if any disagreement 
that my experience, my understanding of my moral situation, and society’s 
understanding of it will differ quite markedly between the two situations. 
 58. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 37, at 249–52. 
 59. See, e.g., Mark C. Niles, Punctuated Equilibrium:  A Model for Administrative Evolution, 
44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 353, 379–92 (2011) (discussing the Triangle Factory fire). 
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about, that is featured in signs in airports and restrooms, and subject to 
a serious legal regime not unlike drug enforcement.”  The individuals 
who run Western Company will probably see things this way; trafficking 
involves an evil act that should not be done.  That the company might 
not get caught is a small consolation, as there is real harm.  That various 
code violations take place with respect to worker health and safety is a 
bit of a problem, but not a big one so long as nothing bad happens.  The 
violation is not evil in itself.  And this intuition is reinforced by the 
knowledge of experienced individuals that the best Western factories, 
and indeed headquarters buildings, in the most developed countries, 
will have any number of building code violations.  And the same is true 
for these individuals’ homes—even the CEO’s lavish residence no doubt 
has any number of building code violations if anyone were to look for 
them. So health and safety do not get the same priority. 
2.  Crafting agreements in the absence of consensus 
There are two sets of problems here.  One is that the actors in the 
developed world do not agree on the human rights standards that ought 
to apply.  Partly this might be characterized easily, and largely accurately, 
as political, and some of this may be a matter of status.  Management can 
be expected to hold different views from labor.  But partly the matter is 
one of background, upbringing, and the like, for these are moral 
opinions, and they may well vary based on geography.  In a rural setting 
where children in farming families routinely “help with chores,” i.e., work 
on the farm, general views on child labor may vary considerably from 
those held in the affluent suburbs in large metropolitan areas.60 
With geography, status, and socioeconomic context in mind, the second 
set of problems should be quite apparent:  views and priorities may differ 
considerably between the developed world and developing countries.  
What may seem like immoral exploitation could also seem like economic 
opportunity that is far better than the alternatives.  On top of this are 
arguments about protectionism, which always lurks in such discussions.  It 
is easy to see how imposing environmental, labor, or similar standards, thus 
raising costs of production in the developing world, will result in protection 
for industries in the developed world.  This phenomenon has been dubbed 
                                               
 60. M. Neil Browne et al., Universal Moral Principles and the Law:  The Failure of One-
Size-Fits-All Child Labor Laws, 27 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (2004) (recognizing different 
perspectives on child labor and arguing that policymakers should avoid “imposing a 
universal moral vision upon other groups in situations as emotionally, economically, 
culturally, and developmentally complex as that of child labor”). 
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the New Protectionism, and there is no shortage of literature and argument.61  
While most of the discussion centers on environmental standards,62 the 
same arguments can and have been made with respect to labor standards.63  
Free trade advocates generally see these sorts of standards as non-tariff 
barriers to trade,64 and while some make serious efforts at reconciling 
environmental and labor protections with the benefits of free trade,65 there 
is no doubt that at least in theory labor and environmental protections will 
also have a trade protectionist valence.  In such situations, the effort to raise 
labor standards in developing countries may hurt workers more than it helps 
them, as the argument goes.66  And even those sympathetic to raising 
                                               
 61. Indeed, there appear to be at least two pieces entitled The New Protectionism, 
including Carl J. Green’s from 1981, 3 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1 (discussing “bilateralism” 
and “legal protectionism” as forms of new protectionism), and Moira L. McConnell’s The 
New Protectionism and Environmental Barriers to Trade Liberalization:  Assessing the Bona Fides of 
Government Action, 2 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 43 (1993) (examining whether environmental 
regulation can constitute either a trade barrier or a subsidy, and whether an adjudicator 
can go beyond the face of the legislation and assess the bona fides of a state’s legislation). 
 62. See, e.g., Seymour J. Rubin, A Predominantly Commercial Policy Perspective, in ENVIRONMENT 
AND TRADE:  THE RELATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 3 (Seymour J. 
Rubin & Thomas R. Graham eds., 1982) (noting that pollution control requires higher 
production costs, resulting in less competitive goods); Don P. Clark, The Greening of 
Protectionism—Industry and Environmental Coalitions to Oppose Trade Pacts, 19 WORLD COMPETITION 
L. & ECON. REV. 105 (1995); McConnell, supra note 61, at 45. 
 63. See generally Lance Compa, Labor Rights and Labor Standards in International 
Trade, 25 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 165 (1993); Amit Dasgupta, Labour Standards and 
WTO:  A New Form of Protectionism, 1 S. ASIA ECON. J. 113 (2000); Brian A. Langille, Eight 
Ways to Think About International Labour Standards, 31 J. WORLD TRADE 27 (1997); Benn 
Steil, ‘Social Correctness’ is the New Protectionism, 73 FOREIGN AFF. 14 (1994). 
 64. See Labour Standards:  Consensus, Coherence and Controversy, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/bey5_e.htm (last visited June 
1, 2019) (“[E]fforts to bring labour standards into the arena . . . are little more than a 
smokescreen for protectionism.”); see also Compa, supra note 63, at 187 (“[T]he labor 
rights argument is just a cover for blocking exports . . . “); Dasgupta, supra note 63, at 
124 (“[T]rade restrictive policies based on humanitarian considerations were . . . camouflage 
for . . . protectionism.”); Moonhawk Kim, Disguised Protectionism and Linkages to the GATT/WTO, 
64 WORLD POL. 426 (2012) (states impose labor regulations that purposefully restrict 
international trade, but with the appearance of an acceptable domestic policy). 
 65. Frank Emmert, Labor, Environmental Standards and World Trade Law, 10 U.C. 
DAVIS J. INT’L L. POL’Y 75 (2003); McConnell, supra note 61. 
 66. See Gary Burtless, Workers’ Rights:  Labor Standards and Global Trade, BROOKINGS 
(Sept. 1, 2001), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/workers-rights-labor-standards-
and-global-trade; Stephen S. Golub, Are International Labor Standards Needed to Prevent 
Social Dumping?, 34 FIN. & DEV. 20 (1997). 
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standards for working conditions recognize the strong link to anti-
globalization.67 
So even within the same developed society, people of good will differ 
on how best to address these issues.  Further, there can even be 
disagreement on the issues themselves, as with child labor.  Everyone is 
against child labor—put in those terms.  But they are not necessarily 
against a fifteen-year-old spending time working on the family farm if he 
is not missing school at the time.  The United States permits quite a lot 
of child labor, despite serious injuries to some of those child workers.68  
Outside the developed world, a child who works may be a child who is 
better nourished and whose family has prospects; that child may have 
no meaningful opportunity to go to school anyway; and the question 
may not be whether the child works but where and in what conditions. 
This lack of consensus is exacerbated by rhetoric that can hide areas 
of substantial agreement.  Not all human rights violations are the same, 
either practically or morally.  Death and crippling injury are worse than 
very long working hours and a six- or seven-day workweek.  We hesitate 
to make these judgments, and the examples can be manipulated to 
turn them around, but recognizing differences of degree can help 
because it can allow second-best solutions where first-best solutions—
much less ideal ones—are impossible.  It is useful to think of a spectrum 
of problematic issues ranging from the worst—such as death, slavery, or 
forced labor—to the controversial and arguably reprehensible that are 
nevertheless not as bad as death.  Candor is helpful for closing deals and 
for achieving some consensus.  If all can agree that forced labor should 
be eradicated from the supply chain, regardless of the indifference of 
public authorities, then there ought to be forward movement with 
respect to that issue.  That deal can be closed.  If there is disagreement 
with respect to some other issue, and no deal can be closed on it, then 
we have to take what we can get.69 
                                               
 67. Richard A. Greenwald, Labor, Liberals, and Sweatshops, in SWEATSHOP USA:  THE 
AMERICAN SWEATSHOP IN HISTORICAL AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 77, 77 (Daniel E. Bender 
& Richard A. Greenwald eds., 2003) (“[I]n fact, the current antisweatshop movement 
is intimately connected to the anti-globalization movement.”); see also GLOBALIZATION 
FROM BELOW:  THE WORLD’S OTHER ECONOMY (Gordon Mathews et al. eds., 2012). 
 68. See supra note 8. 
 69. Unionization and collective bargaining rights require careful observation and 
thought.  Theoretically, they may be separate from, say, issues of forced labor or health 
and safety.  If a contractual regime may help improve matters with respect to forced 
labor and worker safety, it probably ought to be pursued, even if it does not lead to 
unionization rights.  This argument sees the issues as independent, or at least separate.  
On the other hand, either theoretically or empirically, achieving significant 
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As it turns out, there is plenty of room for agreement, and a serious 
desire to make the situation better.  Those facts have been the force 
carrying forward the MCCs.  Whatever can be agreed goes into the 
standards for a particular contract, or (more likely, we hope) in all the 
contracts for a particular company.  The MCCs do not attempt a “one 
size fits all” prescription.  In any event, a company that wants such a set 
of standards can choose from already existing offerings.70  In short, the 
company can choose whatever standards it likes. 
Visualizing how this might work can be helpful.71  The first idea, 
which involves just the company’s own policies, might be considered 
one-dimensional.  The policy may or may not include a commitment 
that is legally enforceable, but it is in any case a single point.  When 
the company requires its suppliers to commit to protecting human 
rights, then the commitments might be considered two-dimensional:  
the policies adopted by one company—a single point—branch out 
across a plane of suppliers, and perhaps their suppliers and contractors 
as well.  There is thus a web of commitments, but they all originate at 
the single point of the buyer who has required the commitments 
through the supply chains that are part of its business.  See Figure 1.72 
 
                                               
improvement with respect to forced labor and worker safety (for example) may be 
impossible without unions that will protect workers.  In other words, unionization 
rights may be “enabling rights” that allow workers to improve their rights against 
forced labor and unsafe working conditions.  See LOCKE, supra note 4, at 18.  In the 
end, though, Provost Locke’s empirical argument seems most tightly linked to public 
protections for workers—in combination with private protections.  See id. at 17 passim.  
These public protections may protect unionization among other things.  In any case, 
the evidence suggests that private compliance is well worth pursuing, and this 
conclusion holds even if private compliance alone is insufficient to lead to significant 
improvements.  Private efforts are a part of the solution, and the MCCs aim to allow 
companies to pursue that part effectively. 
 70. See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text (discussing the UN Guiding 
Principles and other efforts). 
 71. The following is discussed in DAVIES & SNYDER, supra note 16, at 239–42. 
 72. Thanks to Adrian Simion for help with the figures for this Article. 
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Figure 1:  Two-Dimensional Model 
 
 
A more complex and interesting three-dimensional model might also be 
visualized.  A company (call it Buyer A) might belong to an organization 
(like the Fair Labor Association or the Worker Rights Consortium) that sets 
standards, audits compliance, and probably provides a label or a 
certification mark or a seal of approval to show consumers that the products 
are sustainable, or free of forced labor and child labor, and the like.73  It 
                                               
 73. See Margaret M. Blair et al., The New Role for Assurance Services in Global Commerce, 
33 J. CORP. L. 325 (2008).  For a thorough consideration of labeling in this regard, see 
WORKERS’ RIGHTS AND LABOR COMPLIANCE IN GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS:  IS A SOCIAL LABEL 
THE ANSWER? (Jennifer Bair et al. eds., 2014). 
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may require its suppliers and their suppliers and subcontractors to belong 
as well.  But other companies (Buyers B and C, for example) may also 
belong to the organization and require their suppliers, and their suppliers 
and subcontractors, to belong.  Thus, many companies (consider Buyers A, 
B, and C) and their respective suppliers and subcontractors belong to a 
single organization—so the branches are not limited to a single plane or 
web of supply chains but multiple webs on multiple planes.  Many of the 
members of the organization are not linked contractually to each other at 
all.  This model can be visualized as a pyramid, with the standard-setting 
organization (like FLA or WRC) at the apex, with below that a plane of 
Western buyers (A, B, and C), and below that their suppliers (first tiers), 
and below that further suppliers and subcontractors.  See Figure 2. 
Figure 2:  Three-Dimensional Model 
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The three-dimensional model is interesting not only for its 
complexity but also for its function and polity.  First, it might be argued 
that the standard-setting organization here, as elsewhere, serves a 
lawmaking function.  The organization sets rules that are binding for 
many parties.  To be sure they are in some sense voluntary rather than 
mandatory, but in practice they are not especially more voluntary than 
many default or suppletive rules, and in many contexts, they are 
considerably less voluntary (i.e., they are more nearly mandatory for 
those who want to do business in a particular industry).  The rules serve 
much the same function as law, although they are privately made 
rules.74  The polity adds further interest.  Notably, each standard-
setting organization is extraterritorial.  Further, there can be—and 
there are in fact—multiple competing organizations.  If we assume for 
a moment the validity of the first argument, i.e., that each organization 
is like a private lawmaker, then we can see that with competing 
lawmakers a little federalist system arises.  This private regulatory 
competition has many of the same features as public regulatory 
competition, or federalism.  In short, a company may choose a pro-
business, pro-employer standard setter (for obvious reasons), or a 
company may choose a pro-labor organization (e.g., because of labor 
pressure, or from public, NGO, or competitive pressure, or for 
protectionist reasons),75 or it may choose a lax standard-setter, and so 
on—just as a corporation may choose to incorporate in Ohio, or New 
York, or Delaware, or elsewhere.76 
A company might therefore choose a two- or three-dimensional 
model, or both, depending on its views on particular standards.  
Despite the absence of more general consensus, and regardless of 
disagreements on various issues, the parties can arrange their own legal 
regimes through the institution of contract, sometimes simply in a web 
of two-party contracts and sometimes in much more complex ways.  It 
                                               
 74. This kind of argument is considered at length in a different context in David 
V. Snyder, Private Lawmaking, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 371 (2003).  For a recent consideration, 
see Steven L. Schwarcz, Soft Law as Governing Law, 104 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3307418. 
 75. Conventionally the FLA is associated with the first characterization (pro-buyer) 
and the WRC with the second (pro-labor).  See, e.g., ESBENSHADE, supra note 3, at ch. 7, 
and particularly at 12, 183 (noting an NGO parody of the FLA with a “Sweatwash” so-
called award).  Other forms of corporate organization, even ones that provide for 
contractual liability for Western buyers, have been criticized for allowing further 
whitewashing.  See generally Salminen, supra note 27. 
 76. This kind of argument is considered in David V. Snyder, Molecular Federalism 
and the Structures of Private Lawmaking, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 419 (2007). 
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is all an effort to make the standards on which they agree legally 
binding—provided they can solve the doctrinal issues through careful 
drafting.  That is the subject of the next section. 
3.  Drafting legally effective clauses 
The doctrinal problems and drafting challenges are considerable.  
There is a mismatch between the applicable law, which centers on 
goods, and the goals at the forefront here, which center on people.  
The mismatch has its greatest effect on the related issues of warranties 
or quality obligations; breach; remedies; and mitigation.77  In addition, 
further obstacles arise from U.S. tort and statutory law.  The goal of the 
MCCs is to navigate this trap-laden landscape as well as possible. 
The first difficulty can be summed up in one horrific phrase:  Child 
slaves might make great soccer balls.  The balls may well be fit for their 
ordinary purpose (playing soccer) or their ultimate buyers’ particular 
purposes.  Although it is true that a Western company buying the balls 
for resale may find the balls unfit for that company’s purpose—
resale—the balls are unfit only if their method of manufacture 
becomes public, and the businesses involved have every economic 
incentive to assure that such information never becomes public.  
Absent careful drafting, then, soccer balls made by child slaves may 
breach no obligations of quality, at least not in the usual sense. 
Even assuming that the contract contains adequate provisions about 
the conditions in which the balls are produced, a host of remedial 
problems then arise, both legal and practical.  Is there a fundamental 
breach78 or the like,79 allowing termination of the contract, if the balls 
are perfectly good (in some sense) for playing soccer?  Again, assuming 
proper drafting to allow termination, what other remedies are then 
appropriate?  Damages are problematic; again, the balls will sell for full 
value unless the nature of their production becomes public. 
On a related and even more troublesome note, the buyer is under a 
duty to mitigate (very strongly and widely under U.S. law80 and also 
under international law).81  This may be another reason for a buyer not 
to disclose the conditions of production.  And mitigation could 
                                               
 77. See Martin, supra note 33. 
 78. See United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods, art. 25, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 59 [hereinafter CISG]. 
 79. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-612 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
 80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); see also 
U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a). 
 81. CISG art. 77. 
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arguably require resale of the goods.  If the tainted methods of 
manufacture have become known, however, reselling the goods could 
do grave reputational damage to the buyer, although the extent of that 
damage may not be quantifiable with reasonable certainty.82  Given this 
problem, the buyer may be able to argue that refusing to resell the 
goods in these unusual circumstances is actually a step toward 
mitigation, and indeed, this is the approach of the MCCs.83  Although 
such a stance is open to question in terms of mitigation, resale may 
sometimes be prohibited under some laws, as when forced or 
indentured labor is involved.84  But not all situations are so 
straightforward; public law tends to be quite narrow in scope, so if the 
violations by the supplier are related to health and safety (causing 
building collapses and factory fires and thus injury and death, but not 
forced labor), public law would not necessarily protect the buyer’s 
refusal to resell.  Some might think that the best course of action for the 
buyer would be to donate the goods to a charity like the Boys and Girls 
Clubs.  Arguably this helps prevent reputational harm and is thus a step 
toward mitigation (although there are obvious counterarguments); but 
again, if forced labor is involved, public law would prevent donation and 
would require return of the goods.85 
From this point the remedial problems only become further 
complicated.  Many of the damages and mitigation issues could be of 
purely speculative interest because many potential defendants will be 
unable to respond in damages, even if they are subject to suit.  Specific 
performance is no more promising, at least as a coercive remedy.  It 
will frequently be unavailable under U.S. law86 or other common law 
                                               
 82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352. 
 83. Model Contract Clauses, supra note 2, ¶ 5.5(b) & 1104 n.45. 
 84. Federal law prohibits resale when the goods are made by forced labor.  See 
Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1307 (2012) (“All goods, wares, articles, and 
merchandise mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part in any foreign 
country by convict labor or/and forced labor or/and indentured labor under penal 
sanctions shall not be entitled to entry at any of the ports of the United States, and the 
importation thereof is hereby prohibited . . . .”); see also Trade Facilitation and Trade 
Enforcement Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-125, § 910, 130 Stat. 122, 239 (2016) 
(repealing the consumptive demand exception from § 307 of the Tariff Act). 
 85. See id. 
 86. See generally U.C.C. § 2-716 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).  For an 
insightful consideration of the issues around specific performance and injunctions, 
including the value of such clauses even when relief may not be available, see Jonathan 
C. Lipson, Something Else:  Specific Relief for Breach of Human Rights Terms in Supply Chain 
Agreements, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 1751 (2019). 
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systems87 because theoretically damages may be an adequate remedy 
and equitable relief might arguably be unnecessary.  And aside from 
the extraordinary nature of equitable relief in common law systems, 
even civil law systems and international tribunals are likely to deny 
relief that cannot practically be achieved.88  
Regardless of the interesting legal and equitable issues, it would appear 
that most who are involved in this field do not consider damages, specific 
performance, or even termination to be the best responses in most 
situations (although termination may be required in some instances 
where the suppliers are beyond hope).  Rather, remediation—helping 
the supplier to comply with the required principles—generally seems 
preferable.  A termination, after all, may leave the workers in even worse 
shape.  Consider an inquiry after the scandals of the 1990s: 
Caroline Lequesne of Oxfam, a British charity, has just returned 
from Bangladesh, where she visited factories to determine the 
impact of American retailers’ human-rights policies.  She reckons 
that between 1993 and 1994 around 30,000 of the 50,000 children 
working in textile firms in Bangladesh were thrown out of factories 
because suppliers feared losing their business if they kept the 
children on.  But the majority of these children have, because of 
penury, been forced to turn to prostitution or other industries like 
welding, where conditions pose far greater risks to them.89 
Remediation is more a matter of commercial relationships and 
economic leverage, and while law may be relevant, it plays a tertiary 
role.  For example, high switching costs will push buyers strongly 
toward remediation rather than termination for purely economic 
reasons in addition to the human and moral reasons just outlined in 
the Oxfam inquiry. This will be true even when buyers have high 
degrees of leverage over the suppliers.  Still, the bargaining position 
for the buyer who is pushing for remediation can be buttressed by 
appropriate contract drafting, as reflected in the MCCs.90  The point 
                                               
 87. See generally John P. Dawson, Specific Performance in France and Germany, 57 MICH. 
L. REV. 495, 495–96 (1959) (common law became a system “committed to damages as 
its mode of relief,” although specific performance could be available in a few instances 
or when damages are inadequate). 
 88. See Soinco v. NKAP, Zürich Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Award ZHK 
273/95 (May 31, 1996), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960531s1.html (considering 
Swiss and Russian law as well as the CISG). 
 89. Ethical Shopping:  Human Rights, 335 ECONOMIST 58, 58 (1995). 
 90. The phrasing in the text is purposely vague because the best contract-drafting 
strategy in this context poses an interesting question of contract design that is outside 
the scope of this Article.  The party with greater bargaining power may prefer a straight 
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becomes finer when considering the practical context:  frequently the 
violation will be apparent only in recordkeeping.  The obvious question 
then becomes whether the violations are confined to bookkeeping 
practices or instead reflect serious issues with working conditions, human 
trafficking, or other issues.  And there is a world of difference between the 
two, with the gravest human cost hanging in the balance. 
These issues are not the usual stock-in-trade of commercial lawyers; 
controlling clients’ exposure, however, is more familiar, and it is just 
as necessary here.  Certainly, moral obligations and, to some degree, 
legal requirements push companies and their lawyers to do what they 
can to protect workers in international supply chains.  But this is not a 
riskless task, and companies in some respects face increased exposure 
when they attempt to improve supply chain conditions but fail to be 
sufficiently effective.  Some potential liability sounds fundamentally in 
tort, although some of the theories are statutory or even contractual.  
Plaintiffs have pressed claims of negligence, deceptive advertising, and 
trafficking, as well as suits under the Alien Tort Statute.  They have also 
asserted third-party beneficiary theories.  Defendants have for the most 
part prevailed, often reasonably easily, but some cases are going forward 
still, and companies are understandably nervous about the potential for 
liability as the suits move into discovery and further phases of litigation.91 
                                               
termination clause in the contract even if that party contemplates addressing defaults 
through much more constructive, relationship-preserving measures.  See generally Lisa 
Bernstein, Merchant Law in Merchant Court:  Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent 
Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1796–97 (1996).  To take a common example, 
a bank may draft its loan documents to allow it to call the loan (demanding immediate 
repayment in full) even if in many circumstances it will give borrowers a second or 
third chance and will indeed have a whole “Workouts” department devoted to 
administering loans that are in default.  Of course, if circumstances dictate a different 
course, the termination (or in the loan context, acceleration) clause can be invoked 
by the bank, triggering the “end-game norms” instead of the “relationship-preserving 
norms.”  See id.  Similarly, a Western buyer in a supply chain relationship may prefer a 
termination clause even though it contemplates remediation of human rights 
problems rather than outright termination (except in the most hopeless or egregious 
circumstances).  Alternatively, the supply contract may be better designed if it reflects 
expectations more closely, providing for remediation in most circumstances rather 
than termination.  The contract might do so by providing for a notice of default 
followed by a period during which the supplier is allowed (and helped) to cure the 
default.  If the cure is successful, the contract remains in place.  The MCCs give parties 
both options.  It provides for termination in ¶ 2.3, supra note 2, at 1099, but points out 
the benefits (as well as the drawbacks) of a notice-and-cure mechanism, id. at 1100 
n.30.  Which course is better presents an intriguing issue for further exploration. 
 91. These issues and the litigation associated with them are discussed thoroughly 
in Lampley, supra note 55. 
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Concern stems particularly from the trenchant observation of Judge 
Johnston that current tort doctrine encourages Western buyers to 
divorce themselves from the supply chain as much as possible and to 
“ignore[ ] workplace safety” as a means to “escape liability.”92  Judge 
Johnston remarks on the law’s perversion of public policy, noting that 
“the better rule would be to encourage general contractors to take all 
reasonable measures to ensure the safety of all workers . . . .”93  Judge 
Johnston’s point is a salient call for law reform; it is also a warning bell 
for companies who want to encourage health and safety in their supply 
chains.  The MCCs attempt to manage this kind of exposure through 
appropriate disclaimers, but disclaimers can only go so far, and 
companies that are subject to the Federal Acquisition Regulation 
probably cannot use many of them.94 
4. Aiming for operational likelihood in the corporate political landscape 
Part of the impetus for the MCCs is a recognition of corporate 
politics; another part is a desire to reach toward operational 
implementation in addition to formal adoption.  To understand, 
consider Chris Johnson’s eloquent argument that business lawyers are 
uniquely well situated to achieve corporate change with respect to 
human rights protections.95  The general counsel often sits on the 
board or at least has a seat at board meetings; this is an important part 
of the paradigm.  The general counsel will be close to the CEO, and 
they will strategize together, typically forming a common vision.  The 
two working together are in a good position to put forward helpful 
policies for adoption by the board, and once they become policies, 
they can be implemented through the procedures and routines used 
to implement other corporate policies. 
Alternatively, however, once the policies are adopted, they can 
languish.  They may be recorded in corporate minutes, where they will 
never see the light of day, or they may be advertised through the 
                                               
 92. Rahaman v. J.C. Penney Corp., No. N15C-07-174 MMJ, 2016 WL 2616375, at 
*9 n.68 (Del. Super. Ct. May 4, 2016). The complaint was originally filed in the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia and it named Bangladesh as a 
defendant, (No. 15-CV-00619-KBJ (D.D.C. filed Apr. 23, 2015)). 
 93. Id.   
 94. See Model Contract Clauses, supra note 2, ¶ 5.7; FAR § 52.222–56(c) (2018) 
(requiring contractor certification (within threshold limits) that requires the 
contractor to “monitor, detect, and terminate the contract with a subcontractor or 
agent engaging in prohibited activities”). 
 95. Johnson, supra note 7. 
1904 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:1869 
 
corporate web site, where they may do more good.  But the paradigm 
assumed above suggests that for better implementation, the policies 
need to make it into the supply contracts themselves.  On the website 
the policies may be simply aspirational, inspirational, or marketing.  
On the other hand, the contracts in the paradigm are used by Western 
Company for planning and management of its supply chains.  The 
factories where the goods are made use the contracts—particularly 
their schedules or appendixes—to make the goods and to comply with 
their various obligations to Western Company, not only with respect to 
manufacturing, but also with respect to timing, quality control, IP 
protection—and now, we hope, human rights protections.  A key part 
of the strategy behind the MCCs is to put the standards—whatever they 
are (on fire exits, forced labor, recordkeeping, and so on)—into the 
operational part of the transaction, where they will be seen and used 
by the supervisors in the factories, and perhaps by some of the workers 
as well (depending on how the manufacturing process is structured). 
Another strategy behind the MCCs is to focus the attention of the 
general counsel.  It might be too easy for Western Company to assign 
these tasks to the CSR department and then to leave the matter there.  
Because the supply contracts in which the MCCs will be included are 
under the supervision of the general counsel and not just the CSR 
department, the general counsel will need to be conversant with the 
basic issues.  Between the contractual piece and the compliance pieces 
arising from various legislation,96 these issues will be part of the 
portfolio of the general counsel, who can help keep these matters from 
being shunted too far aside.  Paying attention to human rights 
becomes part of what the company will need to do, legally, because of 
its own contracts.  This provides a concrete way for policies to be 
implemented and routinized and not simply to languish unseen 
among other corporate policies or to be plastered prettily but 
ineffectively on the corporate website. 
In short, a contractual approach is meant to garner attention from 
corporate actors who have the power to implement policies, as well as 
to put those policies in a place where they can make a difference—not 
just at the corporate headquarters or on the corporate website. In the 
end, the strategy of focusing on the contract follows the simple maxim 
of many who have experience in what the corporate world calls 
Purchasing: “The purchase order is king.”  If the purchase order is king, 
then the standards need to be in the purchase order.  That such a 
                                               
 96. See supra notes 48–53 and accompanying text. 
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quotidian point could potentially carry so much operational weight is 
telling:  it is the everyday routine that will enable goals to be 
operationalized.  Practical results come from paying attention to actual 
practice.  That is no less true here, where the technical legalese and 
operational outlook of the MCCs provide an avenue for moral 
attentiveness.  That idea brings us to the next section. 
II.    THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACTS IN INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS 
Perhaps it is surprising that simple matters of everyday routine and 
grimy details of operations can carry such moral weight.  Supply 
contracts would seem to be a far cry from the high and ancient theory 
of the political philosophers.  But this Article suggest that these 
mundane but large matters resonate with some of the classical ideas of 
the social contract.  This section does not attempt a thorough 
consideration, which has engendered untold volumes over several 
centuries.  But this Article sketches a particular view of social contracts 
and attempts to place these supply chain agreements under that 
rubric.  To be clear, supply contracts that aim (among other things) to 
protect the human rights, health, and safety of workers are not the 
same as or a substitute for the singular social contract as classically 
theorized.  Still, these international supply chain contracts supplement 
the classical social contract, and they share important virtues and goals 
with it:  they attempt to organize a complex cooperative arrangement 
that has moral and social aspects as well as economic ones.  But these 
supply contracts have moved forward into contemporary society and 
economics.  They recognize and harness the power of multinational 
enterprises, not just nation-states and individuals.  And they are 
transnational, crossing (and largely ignoring) geographic boundaries, 
making them in many ways extraterritorial.  Before reaching these 
points, though, it will be best to begin at the beginning. 
A.   Thinking in Classical Terms 
The theory of the social contract, as understood here, is that 
members of society need to organize themselves to enable cooperation 
and thus to improve their lives.  Contract (writ large) is the appropriate 
vehicle; contract is the device through which persons, by the exercise 
of their will or their consent, arrange their relationships with others.  
The contract is a creation of persons; it is not imposed upon them.  So 
in the first instance, it is organizational and enables cooperation.  
Further, the contracts are motivated by self-interest.  In modern terms, 
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the contract creates value; it gives the parties to the contract something 
they want that they would not otherwise have enjoyed.  The making of 
a social contract is a moral or normative act, and the contract itself is a 
moral and normative artifact.  The making of the contract recognizes 
other parties and their interests; it effectuates the will of the 
contracting parties, fulfilling in some measure their desires; and the 
contract establishes acceptable future action (or norms).  Typically the 
social contract includes assumed norms thought to be self-evident, so obvious 
as to be thought part of the natural order; these are often denominated 
natural rights.  They may be so obvious that they remain unstated but are 
nevertheless important to be recognized, naturally, and perhaps legally. 
So far, this description characterizes both ordinary contracts and 
social contracts.  The difference is that the traditional social contract is 
conceived as existing between persons who come together to establish 
law in order to achieve justice, as in Plato;97 to justify a Sovereign as with 
Hobbes98 or a government as with John Locke;99 or (less practically) a 
small democracy, as with Rousseau.100  These ideas are justifications and 
descriptions of the foundation of the state.  For the most part these 
writers were thinking about the theory of government and the 
foundation of the state at the advent of the modern notion of states, 
considered both domestically and internationally, the latter typically 
pegged to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.  This so-called Westphalian 
system assumes territoriality, the current challenge to which is 
internationalism (denoting the idea that rulemaking and governance 
should be on an international level, often involving international 
organizations like the UN), globalization (denoting a global marketplace 
                                               
 97. PLATO, supra note 29, perhaps published in the late 370s B.C.E.  The Greek (at 
359a) δικαιοσύνη or τὸ δίκαιον is rendered justice, which is achieved through “laws” 
(νόμοι) and “contracts” (Allen) or “covenants” (Paul Shorey trans. 1930 in Loeb ed., 
vol. 1) or compacts (translating ξυνθήκαι), etymologically, things that are put together.  
Similarly, etymologically covenant suggests a coming together, or a compact suggests 
promising together, or a contract suggests drawing together.  For the English 
etymology, see the OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY entries. 
 98. 2 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 165 (1651) (G.A.J. Rogers & Karl Schuhmann 
eds., 2003). 
 99. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT ch. 8, ¶ 97 (1698), in TWO 
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Mark Goldie ed., 1993). 
 100. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT in BASIC POLITICAL WRITINGS 
bk. 2, ch. 9 (Donald A. Cress trans., 1987). 
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and a global economic order), and the corporate power of 
multinational enterprises (which should be obvious).101 
This Article suggests that in this new order a new kind of social 
contract is necessary, not to supplant the social contract expounded by 
the classical theorists, but to supplement it.  A globalized order needs 
a contract that transcends sovereign nations or geographical 
boundaries, and it must involve business enterprises as well as natural 
persons, governments, sovereigns, or even bodies-politic.  The new 
social contracts do not involve or constitute a state, but they are social 
contracts nonetheless.  They are social in that they address social needs, 
possibly because of self-interest but also for moral reasons.  Indeed, 
they are social because they express and seek to fulfill moral 
obligations.  And they follow from some of the classical social contract 
theory because they simultaneously seek to further self-interest and at 
the same time are other-regarding, helping contractual parties as 
moral agents show and act on the human and moral need for 
compassion (as expounded by Rousseau).  These new social contracts 
share many (but certainly not all) of the characteristics of the older 
ones, which will be considered in turn. 
Social contracts organize members of society to allow them to 
cooperate with each other and to better their prospects as a society in a 
normative sense.  The classical theorists (like Plato, Hobbes, Locke, and 
Rousseau) centered their thoughts on natural persons who would enter 
a social contract to better their individual lives, and ultimately, the lives 
of individuals must remain central.  But society now is composed of 
members that include juridical persons, not just of the governmental 
kind that the theorists conceived102 but the modern business enterprise.  
These for-profit business corporations (themselves to a degree 
                                               
 101. This Article does not attempt to catalog the extensive contemporary writings 
on the social contract, the post-Westphalian world order, or the multinational 
enterprise.  Each has its own extensive literature.  Nevertheless, a particularly relevant 
entry should be highlighted as it considers issues in a similar context and provides a 
good entry into the literature.  See DENNIS PATTERSON & ARI AFILALO, THE NEW GLOBAL 
TRADING ORDER:  THE EVOLVING STATE AND THE FUTURE OF TRADE (2008); see also 
Horatia Muir Watt, Governing Networks:  A Global Challenge for Private International Law, 
22 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 352 (2015). 
 102. Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau were all considering states of different sorts.  
Plato, much earlier, at least considered a collective when he thought of a city, although 
it may not have been an entity in the same sense as a sovereign or a government 
considered by the early modern thinkers.  See PLATO, supra note 29, bk. II, at 368e–
369a, at 50 (considering cities in addition to individuals). 
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contractarian, but that is a subject for another day)103 were created and 
allowed to flourish because of the economic growth they foster.  The law 
now treats them as persons not simply with traditional juridical 
capacities like being able to hold assets and incur liabilities, and to sue 
and be sued, but to speak and advocate as part of the body-politic.104  
Aside from these legal and political rights, there can be little dispute that 
business corporations act as influential members of society.  The valence 
of this action is certainly subject to debate (is it good or bad?), and the 
granting of political rights like free speech is assuredly controversial, but 
there is little doubt that corporations, factually, act as members of 
society.  The new social contracts in international supply chains 
accommodate this reality.  Corporations make these contracts. 
The reason they make international supply contracts is to enable 
cooperation and to create value.  At least at first blush, this seems 
obvious.  The contracts establish a commercial relationship, often a 
complicated one whose complexities in the context of supply chains 
merit a whole field of study.  But the point of the contract (or 
contracts) is to allow persons to work together, to create economic 
benefits for each other, and to improve their lives when without the 
contracts they would be strangers living independently and without an 
ability to render benefits to each other.  The contracts enable and 
effectuate that mutually beneficial relationship.  That, at least, is the 
motivation for the contracts; that is what the parties want.  In Adam 
Smith’s classic phrase summing up the idea of “bargain,” each party is 
saying, “Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you 
want.”105  The buyers are looking for manufacturing, to make money; 
the suppliers are looking for a market, to make money; the workers are 
looking for jobs, to make money—and perhaps to do more than make 
money.  (It is perhaps worth noting that manufacturing supply chains 
that capture the value of labor seem perfectly if ironically orthogonal to 
                                               
 103. Contractual Governance:  The Role of Private Ordering was the title for a panel held 
by the Association of American Law Schools (Jan. 4, 2019).  The published papers are 
Jill E. Fisch, Governance by Contract:  The Implications for Corporate Bylaws, 106 CALIF. L. 
REV. 373 (2018); Yaron Nili & Cathy Hwang, Shadow Governance, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2020); Megan Wischmeier Shaner, Interpreting Organizational “Contracts” 
and the Private Ordering of Public Company Governance, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 985 (2019).  
 104. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 343 (2010) (holding 
that non- and for-profit corporations, labor unions, and other associations enjoy the 
rights granted by the Free Speech Clause); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 105. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 7 (5th ed. 1789). 
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John Locke’s ideas about labor, value, and property.)106  This—the 
money and the economic advantage—is the motivation, and in classical 
(if outmoded) contract theory, this may be sufficient; it is certainly 
necessary.107  In their inception and their aggregate effects, supply chain 
contracts, like the classical social contract, are motivated by self-interest. 
Moving from motivation and effects of the contracts to their 
characteristics, note that the supply contract—or the web of contracts 
that make up a supply chain—organize complex, multifaceted and 
often multi-dimensional commercial relationships108 just as a social 
contract organizes the polity of a society.  This is no small task, either 
with respect to political and constitutional organization or to the 
establishment of complex supply chains that may span the globe and 
that do not subsist in just one political or legal jurisdiction.  But they 
do take on that organizational task, and they are often successful, and 
this remarkable fact resonates deeply in Hobbes.  In his theory no one 
can force members of society to cooperate when they are in a state of 
nature; they need the social contract to constitute the common-wealth 
and a Sovereign who can extract human cooperation if need be.109  In 
the time of the classical theorists, the cooperation happened in the 
nation-state that was constituted by the social contract.  International 
supply chains are largely divorced from nation states, or even nations 
and national boundaries.  The nation-state and its laws are not entirely 
outmoded—the rule of law that they provide is necessary for the 
contracts to have legal force, and their authoritative rulemaking power 
may be necessary to effectuate the social goals of these supply 
contracts110—but the supply contracts in their global and transnational 
character provide a necessary supplement.  The supply chain relationship 
is voluntarily constituted, and it is successful (economically), motivated by 
                                               
 106. LOCKE, supra note 99, ¶¶ 27–28, at 128 (“[w]hatsoever then he removes out of 
the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and 
joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property,” i.e., 
“excludes the common right of other men”).  I suggest that international supply chain 
contracts are orthogonal to the labor theory because they intersect with that theory 
but go in a different direction:  the workers realize some value from their labor, but 
much is captured by the employers or Western buyers. 
 107. ROUSSEAU, supra note 100, bk. II, ch. 4, at 157 (“[C]ommitments that bind us to the 
body politic are obligatory only because they are mutual, and their nature is such that in 
fulfilling them one cannot work for someone else without also working for oneself.”). 
 108. See supra notes 71–76 and accompanying text. 
 109. HOBBES, supra note 98, at 101 (no one can “over-awe” man in a state of nature), 
115 (justice and propriety start with the constitution of the common-wealth). 
 110. See LOCKE, supra note 4, at 17 passim. 
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self-interest and human reason.  Perhaps too it is remarkably Hobbesian, 
in the pejorative sense—which is to say that it is marked by misery as well 
as felicity, to borrow his words.111  That problem leads to the next section. 
B.   The Moral Nature of Social Contracts 
There is more to the social contract (and at least arguably, all 
contracts):  they have a moral or normative component.  Contracts 
consist of promises; legally enforceable promises invoke duties both 
legal and moral in nature.112  Supply contracts are sets of promises, and 
promising is a moral act.  This is true not only in the sense that 
breaching a contract and thus breaking a promise is immoral (or at 
least so it seemed before Holmes, and so it still often seems, as to 
Fried).113  It is also true that making a promise and accepting a counter-
promise is itself a moral act and reveals the morality of the promisors; 
contracting is an “exercise of moral agency.”114 
Yet there is an additional moral dimension for a contract that is 
properly a social contract.  It takes into account, and seeks to achieve, 
a broad, far-reaching order that involves many people (members of 
society), and it seeks to achieve social obligations, perhaps even social 
justice, of which equality is a part.  Indeed, one of the most striking 
aspects of Hobbes’s exposition is the equality on which he insists for all 
men.115  In his account, to be sure, this is hardly the happy equality of 
childhood platitudes, and indeed this equality is part of the explanation 
for war and misery.116  But equality is there, nevertheless, by nature.117 
And where Hobbes is surprisingly founded on equality, Rousseau is 
surprisingly rooted in compassion.  Man is naturally compassionate, 
Rousseau argues, and this compassion tempers the ferocity of his 
                                               
 111. HOBBES, supra note 98, at 99. 
 112. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. 
REV. 708 (2007) (arguing that promises are moral in nature, even in contracts, so 
contract doctrine should accommodate the need to act morally). 
 113. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE:  A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 
(2d ed. 2015). 
 114. Aditi Bagchi, Voluntary Obligation and Contract, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 
(forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3171189 
(responding to HANOCH DAGAN & MICHAEL HELLER, THE CHOICE THEORY OF CONTRACTS 
(2017)). 
 115. HOBBES, supra note 98, at 99 (men by nature are equal). 
 116. Id. at 100–05. 
 117. Id. at 99. 
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egocentrism.118  The motive for compassion is greater than a mere 
feeling of pity, for compassion allows the “pleasure of doing good.”119  
With this compassion, man can exercise his ability to choose how to 
live after the fall from the state of nature and the ills borne of the 
advent of property.120  This choice he can exercise through entering 
into the social compact.121  Similarly, companies can fulfill their social 
obligations, and can reach for a more just society, by attending to 
fundamental moral matters in their contracts.  If they are to have 
political rights like free speech,122 they also ought to have duties rooted 
in human compassion.  Their supply contracts can thus be a new kind 
of social contract.  This seems well worth doing. 
In reality the picture, notoriously, is not entirely rosy.  Society 
without question falls far short of the ideals.  The Enlightenment 
writers saw as much themselves, and Rousseau is perhaps best known 
for the first sentence of The Social Contract: “Man is born free; and 
everywhere he is in chains.”123  Certainly even the most ambitious and 
idealistic supply contract will pale next to any utopian conception.  
Whether in discussing the state or a supply chain, it can hardly be said 
that we all place our power in the general will, nor do we all receive 
“an indivisible part of the whole.”124 
Beyond these obvious facts, the vision of the classical theorists 
themselves was limited.  As Charles W. Mills observes, “in keeping with 
the Roman precedent, European humanism usually meant that only 
                                               
 118. ROUSSEAU, supra note 100, at 177 (English), 119–20 (French).  The word pitié 
is usually and perhaps best translated as pity but I will use compassion or compassionate, 
which seems fair in that Rousseau uses the adjective compatissant to explain what he 
means by pitié (reconnaître l’homme pour un être compatissant et sensible).  Examination of 
a related passage also suggests compassion:  man has an “innate repugnance to seeing 
a fellow-creature suffer,” and indeed, man will himself suffer if he cannot help a 
mother and child who are under attack (as seen in the Fable of the Bees).  Discourse 
on the Origin of Inequality (the Second Discourse), pt. 1, at *XV (1754), in THE BASIC 
POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU 53 (Donald A. Cress ed. & trans. 1987), 
and in DISCOURS SUR L’ORIGINE ET LES FONDEMENTS DE L’INEGALITE PARMI LES HOMMES 38 
(Jean-Louis Lecercle ed. 1983) (in French). 
 119. ROUSSEAU, supra note 100, at 201, penultimate paragraph of the 2d discourse 
(in English), in French at 43 (le plaisir de bien faire). 
 120. On the ills of property and the consequences of the fall, see ROUSSEAU, supra 
note 100, at 202. 
 121. Id. at 111 (in English), which is On the Social Contract, bk. IV, ch. 2 (1762). 
 122. See supra note 104 (discussing Citizens United). 
 123. ROUSSEAU, supra note 100, at 35. 
 124. Id. at 24. 
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Europeans were human.”125  From a feminist rather than a racial 
standpoint, Carol Pateman argues that the social contract is preceded 
by an earlier “pact” subjecting women to men,126 and the role of gender 
seems particularly relevant here as so many workers in international 
supply chains are women.127  This gender division internationally 
accords with trends in the United States as well.128  Virginia Held, from 
a different feminist perspective, observes that using contracts as a 
paradigm for human relations is dreadfully constrained.129  
“[C]ontractual theories,” she says, “hold out an impoverished view of 
human aspiration.”130  Contractarian thought also fails to account for 
the experience of many people, particularly women.131 
These points can hardly be refuted, but they can perhaps be taken 
into account.  No doubt Professors Mills and Pateman and countless 
others will consider it a paltry response, as they have more radical 
solutions in mind, but any contractarian approach, such as the one 
suggested in this Article, must count all humans as equals.  Of course, 
in practice they are not, and this fact founds the arguments for radical 
change.  But this Article takes a pragmatic approach and rests on a 
belief that radical solutions (even assuming that they would be justified 
and effective) are not within the realm of current possibility.  Contracts 
are what are used to institute and organize supply chains.  Their 
contractual nature resonates with the learning of the social contract 
theorists.  And those theories teach important moral as well as legal 
and political lessons, although their moral nature is often overlooked.  
In short, following Hobbes’s insistence on equality and expanding it to 
everyone, and taking John Locke’s rejection of patriarchal society 
seriously, translating it to our contemporary conceptions, will be 
necessary for a morally justifiable use of social contract theory to 
ground our views of supply contracts. 
                                               
 125. CHARLES W. MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT 27 (1997). 
 126. CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 2 (1988). 
 127. For the effect of the Bangladeshi disasters, see supra note 5 (many garment 
workers are women).  It appears that the vast majority of garment workers, at least, are 
women.  Sweatshops in Bangladesh, WAR ON WANT, https://waronwant.org/sweatshops-
bangladesh (last visited June 1, 2019) (noting that 85% of garment workers are women). 
 128. DANIEL E. BENDER, SWEATED WORK, WEAK BODIES:  ANTI-SWEATSHOP CAMPAIGNS 
AND LANGUAGES OF LABOR (2004); JENNY MORRIS, WOMEN WORKERS AND THE SWEATED 
TRADES:  THE ORIGINS OF MINIMUM WAGE LEGISLATION (1986). 
 129. VIRGINIA HELD, FEMINIST MORALITY:  TRANSFORMING CULTURE, SOCIETY, AND 
POLITICS 193–95 (1993). 
 130. Id. at 194. 
 131. Id. at 194–95. 
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I would suggest a different response to Professor Held’s argument.  
She would re-center our paradigm from contract to something else, 
and she explores the mother-child relation as one alternative.132  This 
caring relationship fits well with Rousseau’s exploration of natural 
human compassion.  If we can take account of these three critics, the 
contracts at issue—international supply chain contracts—must treat all 
parties as equals and must allow for rights and duties of compassion.  
These are moral rights and duties, not legal ones, but the supply chain 
contracts can allow the parties to meet their moral duties and to make 
them legal.133  In this sense the supply chain contracts are social 
contracts, in a sense that is partly the same and partly different from 
the classical ideas.  But they are designed to achieve justice, to enable 
cooperation, to organize a large, complex, and far-flung cooperative 
relationship, and to be mutually beneficial.  And they seek to reach out 
in societal directions, not to constrain themselves to ordinary two- or 
three-party contractual relations. 
These new social contracts, then, share some aims of the social 
contract—organizational and moral goals across a diffuse polity—but 
they are new in some ways, more modest in some ways, and more 
ambitious in others.  The new social contracts are made by 
multinational enterprises, where the classical social contract was made 
by individuals (and perhaps the political entity they thus formed, like 
the nation-state or the sovereign).  In that way, these supply chain 
contracts are new social contracts.  In that they do not seek to form an 
entire political system, they are more modest, of course.  At the same 
time, they are more ambitious in that they stretch across borders and 
beyond states, fitting a world more global than could have been 
conceived in early modern times.  These contracts are also more 
modest in that they are more time-constrained; they do not seek to be 
permanent or even (typically) indefinite.  But they are iterative:  a 
contract for one set of shirts can lead to a contract for another set, and 
another, and so on.  As the contractual process repeats, the parties 
have the opportunity to learn and grow, to adjust their relationship, 
and to build a shared vision and purpose.134  In an ordinary contract, 
this learning is geared to a commercial purpose.  In the kinds of 
contracts envisioned here—these new social contracts—that learning 
                                               
 132. Id. at 195. 
 133. Cf. Shiffrin, supra note 112, at 709 (advocating for contracting principles that 
encourage morality). 
 134. See generally MACNEIL, supra note 3.  
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and building can move the parties not only to greater economic 
efficiency but also toward shared moral commitments, even though 
they come from vastly disparate societies. 
C.   The Special Moral Duties that Attend Supply Chain Relationships 
Having argued that contracts have essential moral aspects and that 
social contracts even more so, the moral obligations particular to 
supply chain contracts deserve special consideration.  There is a 
problem here:  ordinarily contracts are not conceived as being entered 
to achieve broad social effects, much less social justice,135 and indeed 
that is part of the argument for why supply chain contracts with human 
rights protections are properly considered social contracts.  But what of 
the relationship between Western Company and the people who work 
in its supply chain, when they are separated by thousands of miles and 
several (if not many) legal links, separating and insulating Western 
Company?  Relationship, causation, and proximity are all central to 
both legal analysis and moral reasoning. 
Whatever moral responsibility Western Company has toward 
geographically and legally distant workers might seem weak.  To be 
sure, Western Company receives a benefit from the workers, and this 
benefit might found a claim in justice.  Following Aristotle’s reasoning, 
that claim becomes even stronger if the workers are harmed while 
conveying that benefit.136  These ideas are behind some of the litigation 
around the disasters in Bangladesh,137 and these kinds of ideas also 
pervade the literature that seeks to hold Western buyers responsible 
for injuries to workers in supply chains.138  That a two-party contract 
can have innumerable effects on many who are not party to the 
                                               
 135. The same has traditionally been true for business corporations, as discussed 
briefly infra note 141. 
 136. ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. V, 1130a14-1133b28 (David Ross 
trans., 1980).  See generally Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice in a Nutshell, 52 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 349 (2002). 
 137. E.g., Rahaman v. J.C. Penney Corp., No. N15C-07-174MMJ, 2016 WL 2616375, 
at *9 n.68 (Del. Super. Ct. May 4, 2016). 
 138. See, e.g., David Kinley & Jahan Navidi, The Long Arm of Human Rights Risk:  Supply 
Chain Management and Legal Responsibility, 3 BUS. & HUM. RTS. REV. 10 (2013); Justine 
Nolan, Business and Human Rights:  The Challenge of Putting Principles into Practice and 
Regulating Global Supply Chains, 42 ALT. L.J. 42 (2017); Ryan J. Turner, Commentary, 
Transnational Supply Chain Regulation:  Extraterritorial Regulation as Corporate Law’s New 
Frontier, 17 MELB. J. INT’L L. 188 (2016). 
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contract is certainly a familiar notion,139 and there is no doubt about 
the far-reaching effects of supply contracts in international supply 
chains.140  Whatever merit these arguments may hold, I explore a 
different moral and legal calculus based on considerations of whether 
there should be a duty to rescue. 
To begin, observe that Western Company (assuming that 
corporations have moral as well as legal duties)141 probably has a 
                                               
 139. See, e.g., Aditi Bagchi, Other People’s Contracts, 32 YALE J. ON REG. 211 (2015) 
(examining how third parties—such as downstream buyers, suppliers, and 
consumers—are affected by contract). 
 140. See, e.g., Alice Evans, Hope for Reform:  Strengthening Corporate Accountability in 
Global Supply Chains, RESEARCHGATE (Mar. 2019), https://www.researchgate.net/ 
publication/326293484_Hope_for_Reform_Strengthening_Corporate_Accountabilit
y_in_Global_Supply_Chains. 
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Contested Visions:  The Value of Systems Theory for Corporate Law, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 
615 (2018) (“[T]he systems approach does not focus on profits alone, and does not 
direct managers to try to maximize them.”); Tom C.W. Lin, Incorporating Social Activism, 
98 B.U. L. REV. 1535, 1593 (2018) (“Contemporary corporate social activism . . . shifts 
businesses from their traditional singular, amoral purpose of profit maximization to a 
new multivariate aim that takes into greater consideration social impact and social 
value on an equivalent or nearly equivalent basis as profit maximization.”).  Views are 
divided, however.  Many scholars continue to adhere to shareholder primacy.  See 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy:  The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 
97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 563 (2003) (“[M]ost corporate law scholars embrace some 
variant of shareholder primacy.”).  And crucially, Delaware adheres to shareholder 
primacy and profit maximization.  See eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 
A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010).  For the classic statement of the traditional view, see Dodge 
v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A business corporation is 
organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.”).  Nevertheless, 
fulfilment of moral duties may in fact be profit-maximizing corporate strategies, see 
Lin, supra, at 1595, in which case corporations would have further reason to pursue 
their moral goals.  Stephen Bainbridge, Case Law on the Fiduciary Duty of Directors to 
Maximize the Wealth of Corporate Shareholders, STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE’S J.L., RELIGION, POL., 
& CULTURE (May 5, 2012), https://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbri 
dgecom/2012/05/case-law-on-the-fiduciary-duty-of-directors-to-maximize-the-wealth-
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relatively weak moral duty to, say, children who are dying of starvation 
and disease in a part of the world where it has no operations, no 
personnel, no contracts (directly or indirectly), and in short, no 
connection, except insofar as Western Company is a citizen of the world.  
To be sure, some moral duty may be present.  Individuals may feel 
morally obligated to send money to responsible aid agencies to work 
toward fulfilling such a duty.  But those who choose not to do so are not 
castigated as evil, or even morally irresponsible.  Perhaps there is some 
moral duty to rescue those starving children, but in practice it seems 
weak.  Few feel the need to sell their cars and forego their other comforts 
to raise money to send to famine-ridden parts of the world. 
On the legal side, to say that there is no duty to rescue is a fair 
statement of the general rule, but the rule is subject to a variety of 
exceptions.  Helpfully, the rescue scenarios are factually, morally, 
legally, and socially similar to supply chain relationships.  In this 
context, the common law has (so far) largely refused legal cognizance 
for duties that the law considers (at most) moral and social, and in a 
number of fact-situations, there may be no generally accepted moral 
or social duty at all.  But a variety of facts can affect the analysis and 
may change the outcome:  whether the magnitude of harm is great; 
whether the rescue is difficult and whether it is likely to succeed; 
whether the potential rescuer caused the problem; whether the parties 
have a relationship with each other; whether the victim is reasonably 
relying on the rescuer; and finally, the degree of inconvenience or 
danger to the rescuer.142  Each of these factors is worth consideration, 
and as will become apparent, some of them probably need to be viewed 
through a normative lens to be morally intelligible.  The “just and 
reasonable” test will help give moral grounding where necessary. 
1. The magnitude of harm to the victim 
This factor is the easiest in the paradigm assumed, for the magnitude 
of potential harm is infinite in moral terms—loss of life, grievous 
injury, all multiplied by hundreds or thousands—and quantifiable but 
                                               
of-corporate-shareholders.html.  This conclusion seems particularly plausible in the 
case of supply chains for companies in consumer-facing industries, where companies 
who ignore the human rights of the workers in their supply chains may suffer serious 
punishment at the hands of their consumer buyers, with considerable damage to their 
brand value.  The same may be true even outside consumer markets.  But extended 
exploration of these questions is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 142. See McCall Smith, supra note 1, at 87.  I follow McCall Smith’s analysis 
throughout this section of the Article. 
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still large in economic terms.  The economics are calculable and 
amenable to application of the Hand formula from United States v. 
Carroll Towing Co.143  More specifics would require empirical 
quantification, but in the paradigm it is safe to say that frequently the 
burden of preventing the harm is significantly less than the magnitude of 
harm multiplied by its probability.  In other words, frequently this factor 
will militate toward imposing a duty to improve working conditions.  This 
factor is only one of many, though, and it may be defeated by the 
complications that arise in the analysis of the other factors. 
2. The difficulty of rescue and its likelihood of success 
This factor is terrifically complex, although the complexity can be 
conveyed briefly.  Bookend hypotheticals clarify the situation.  A 
company that says, “There is nothing we can do to help,” does not 
make a credible statement.  A company that commits to eradicating 
labor problems in its supply chain takes on what is at least a daunting, 
multigenerational task, if not an impossible one.  A company that 
commits to a middle position—improving working conditions in its 
supply chain and eliminating the most egregious problems—takes on 
a task that seems possible, reasonable, and perhaps necessary, 
although change may be incremental.  To be sure, for many the middle 
ground is insufficient, and such companies in their eyes deserve to be 
pilloried for their lack of commitment to a full-scale ideal.  But to many 
a commitment to the ideal seems impractical if not impossible. 
These hypotheticals suggest that there is a reasonable likelihood that 
a company could succeed in improving working conditions to a 
meaningful degree some of the time.  The task appears difficult, 
complex, and unlikely to succeed all of the time.  The available 
evidence suggests, in short, that some progress is possible but that it 
falls far short unless it is bolstered by public efforts.144 
                                               
 143. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).  The usual formula is B < PL, meaning that if the 
burden of preventing the harm (B) is less than the probability of harm (P) multiplied 
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3. Causation 
Obviously, if a potential rescuer put the victim in the predicament, 
the rescuer’s obligation to rescue becomes stronger.  But if the putative 
rescuer can say, “Your damage has got nothing to do with me.  I did 
not cause it,” the courts will be quite reluctant to impose liability.145  
Liability would challenge common notions even on the traditional 
rescue example of the stranger walking by the person drowning.  
Arguably the putative rescuer’s inaction—his failure to rescue—causes 
the damage, and theoretically this is factually true.  To apply the “but 
for” test:  but for the failure to rescue, the victim would not have 
drowned.  Yet to say that the passerby caused the victim to drown does 
serious damage to the language.  Put more concretely:  If I say Cooper 
caused Alex to drown, it sounds like Cooper threw Alex in the water, 
not that Cooper failed to rescue him (although that understanding is 
still possible).  In this example, then, it seems that causation is absent, 
but the position is not entirely clear. 
The position in the context of international supply chains differs 
from the example of drowning and is in some ways clearer, although 
the conclusion is hardly crystalline.  Western Company did not put the 
workers in a position of great desperation for a job.  That was a matter 
of circumstantial luck (another instance of moral luck),146 and Western 
Company has no greater moral duty than anyone else in the world to 
improve the workers’ initial situation.  By providing employment that 
improves the workers’ lives, collectively and in the aggregate at least, 
Western Company has made matters better, not worse.  Let us suppose 
that Western Company does not provide a “living wage,” although 
wages in working (indirectly) for Western Company are higher than 
otherwise would be available.  It would seem ambitious to argue that 
Western Company must provide a living wage, although the argument 
is appealing and is frequently made.  It is not clear why it is wrong to 
take an incremental step in the right direction, even if it does not reach 
the goal that might be hoped for, given the starting position that 
Western Company owes no particular duty to these workers (before 
they started working, at least indirectly, for Western Company) in the 
first place.  Probably the strongest argument for a duty to provide a 
living wage is the same as the one that applies in any context:  if 
Western Company is making profits and paying some people wages 
well above a living wage, then there are moral reasons to require the 
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pie to be split differently, to equalize pay, and to assure that everyone 
can at least subsist above the poverty level.  This argument is beyond 
the scope of the current inquiry.  If it holds outside the context of 
international supply chains, it presumably should hold within that 
context.  But such a showing has not been widely accepted. 
On the other hand, if the (indirect) operations of Western Company 
put workers in harm’s way—depriving them of their liberty, their 
health, or their lives—the causal connection is different.  No longer 
can Western Company say, “Your damage has got nothing to do with 
me.  I did not cause it.”147  The case is strongest with respect to forced 
labor:  the need to satisfy the production requirements caused 
traffickers to force the victim to work.  Less obvious is the worker who 
is injured or killed in the factory over which Western Company has no 
direct control (a point that we will return to).148  If the factory catches 
fire or collapses because of poor management by those with direct 
control, arguably Western Company did not “cause” the damage, but it 
is debatable.  In any case Western Company cannot say, “Your damage 
has got nothing to do with me.”  The damage has at least something to 
do with Western Company.  This would suggest a moderate causal 
connection:  not the strongest case, but not the weakest either. 
The causal prong, then, suggests that Western Company owes a moral 
duty to prevent forced labor and to avoid endangering workers.  Still, each 
of these statements has been parenthetically qualified with the indirect 
nature of the relationship between Western Company and international 
workers.  Legally, the intermediated nature of the relationship has (so far) 
largely insulated the companies from monetary liability.149  But perhaps 
the most salient question is whether the supply chain itself provides a 
sufficient relationship to ground the moral duty even in the absence of 
the strongest causal connection:  while it is useful to separate cause and 
relationship, a link should also be recognized.  Where there is a 
sufficiently close and strong relationship, we may say that one person has 
caused harm to another even though the first has only failed to act.  A 
parent who fails to provide food and shelter to a young child may well be 
said to have caused the child’s death.  But it is unlikely that many would 
say I have caused the death of a child with whom I have no relationship 
and who lives on another continent.  The relationship between Western 
Company and its workers is considered in the next section. 
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4. The relationship between Western companies and workers in the developing world 
“‘Proximity’ may not sound like a term which carries a great deal of 
moral baggage,”150 but it does, and every lawyer who has struggled 
through the study of proximate cause knows the central place of 
proximity in legal reasoning.  To tweak the scenario that concluded the 
previous section:  I may owe a greater duty to someone in immediate 
need of my assistance if he is on my doorstep than I owe to a child 
starving on another continent.  For example, if to save someone’s life I 
need to do something that would result in the complete and immediate 
uninsured loss of my car, I would do so in an instant and would be 
blameworthy if I do not do so.  But I do not need to sell my car to donate 
the proceeds to save ten starving children on another continent. 
This, at least, is our intuition and experience (for most of us—with 
occasional saintly exceptions).  Whether this can withstand moral and 
philosophical scrutiny, however, is controversial.  Peter Singer, for 
instance, argues that I ought to take care of those ten starving children 
on another continent if I can; I ought to sell my car, particularly since 
I am perfectly capable of taking public transportation or riding my 
bicycle.151  If we are to take human equality seriously, as Hobbes insists 
and as was happily conceded above,152 it would seem, at least at first, 
that Singer must be right.153 
Such a conclusion offends our common experience, however, and 
other philosophers would justify our intuition.  We all may recognize 
some duty to distant victims of famine, but that duty may be overshadowed 
by more immediate needs.  In deciding how to act, we will need to 
distinguish between what is required by duty and what goes beyond what 
duty requires (i.e., what is supererogatory).154  In assessing moral duties, 
we have to remember that humans have limited capacity, and efforts to 
aid will be limited in scope.  In deciding what efforts are required, 
efficiency ought to be considered, and while the world is shrinking 
through technological innovation, our resources can be deployed more 
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efficiently when the need is proximate.  It is not a mistake to invest most 
heavily in those near us,155 especially when the realities of human 
psychology—our likely responses and empathy—are considered.156 
These ideas reinforce the duties of Western buyers to workers in 
their supply chains.  Even if Professor Singer’s far-reaching notions of 
moral duty are rejected, the supply chain creates a connection157 and 
brings Western Company into much closer proximity to workers in the 
supply chain.  Supply chains are in fact about the efficient deployment 
of resources; that very efficiency can be brought to bear to protect 
human rights as it is harnessed to manufacture goods.  However it is 
considered, from the standpoint of moral proximity there is enough 
connection between Western Company and supply chain workers to 
found a moral duty to provide safe and healthy working conditions for 
free women and men. 
The irony is that the law does everything it can to push the parties 
apart and to break the link of proximity.  As proximity founds a moral 
duty, it can bring a legal one, and Western Company is safest if it has 
as little to do as possible with the operations in its supply chain.  Legal 
considerations will repel Western Company from involvement with 
what is happening in its factories, as recent litigation underscores; the 
more control Western Company exerts, and the more steps it takes to 
improve working conditions in supply chain factories, the greater its 
legal exposure.158  This seems counterproductive and raises questions 
about the legal liability regime.159  Arguably human rights duties, given 
this policy consideration (as opposed to the moral consideration) 
should be taken on voluntarily and should be in the nature of 
contractual rather than delictual obligation.  In other words, the moral 
duty should not be imposed as a legal duty, but the law should allow it 
                                               
 155. See Arnold Burms, Proximity and Particularism, 3 ETHICAL PERSP. 157 (1996). 
 156. See Per Nortvedt & Marita Nordhaug, The Principle and Problem of Proximity in 
Ethics, 34 J. MED. ETHICS 156 (2008). 
 157. One way to establish a relationship, of course, is by voluntarily undertaking 
one.  See R v. Stone & Dobinson [1977], 1 QB 354 (Eng.); McCall Smith, supra note 1, 
at 63–64 (citing R v. Instan [1893], 1 QB 450 (Eng.)). 
 158. See Rahaman v. J.C. Penney Corp., No. N15C-07-174MMJ, 2016 WL 2616375, 
at *9 n.68 (Del. Super. Ct. May 4, 2016) (noting that “as long as the general contractor 
ignores workplace safety, the general contractor is shielded from liability to the 
employees of independent contractors”). 
 159. See id.  Although the context is entirely different, the problem is discussed 
thoroughly in NICK GILL, NOTHING PERSONAL? GEOGRAPHIES OF GOVERNING AND 
ACTIVISM IN THE BRITISH ASYLUM SYSTEM 23 (2016) (“[E]xplor[ing] the issue of moral 
distance as it relates to administering . . . bureaucracy.”). 
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to be assumed when there is an express manifestation of assent or other 
evidence of the willing and voluntary assumption of a legal duty.160  
Indeed, assumption of such duties perhaps should even be promoted by 
rules like Good Samaritan statutes, encouraging companies to take 
active measures to improve conditions rather than impelling companies 
to stay as far away as possible.161  In some jurisdictions such a duty might 
be undertaken even through promises that might not be considered 
contractual under U.S. law.162  This strategy might achieve the right 
policy result and probably promotes (although is not the same as) the 
correct moral result.  It also promotes the employment of poor workers 
in the developing world, which is also a good result as a matter of policy 
and morality.163  That idea will be discussed shortly. 
5. Reliance 
It is certainly possible to conceive of a victim as relying on the 
potential rescuer.164  In one sense, the drowning man is relying on the 
stranger walking by to throw him the life preserver that has been 
helpfully placed by the authorities at the waterside.  But in another 
sense, particularly for those used to thinking in contractual terms, the 
idea of reliance suggests that the person relying made a decision in 
reliance on another person, and that in this way reliance does not 
make sense as a justification for finding a duty to rescue.  It is true that 
                                               
 160. Allowing Western Company to assume the duty would comport with Shiffrin, 
supra note 112, at 719, 736, 742.  The “willing and voluntary” nature of the undertaking 
should be emphasized, and clear and convincing evidence might be required:  if the 
courts are too quick to imply an undertaking, the judiciary will again push Western 
buyers away from their supply chains. 
 161. See infra Section II.C.6. 
 162. See PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW art. 2:107 (2005); PRINCIPLES, 
DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW:  DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF 
REFERENCE, bk. II, arts. 1:103(2), 4:301–4:303 (Christian von Bar et al. eds., 2010); 
Muriel Fabre-Magnan, Les Fausses Promesses des Entreprises:  RSE et Droit Commun des 
Contrats, in ETUDES EN L’HONNEUR DE PHILIPPE NEAU-LEDUC:  LE JURISTE DANS LA CITE 451, 
454 (2018).  Similar ideas have been litigated in the United States.  See Order Denying 
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Nat’l Consumers League v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 
2015 CA 007731 B, 2016 WL 4080541, at *11 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 22, 2016) (holding 
that the complaint stated a claim based on defendants’ allegedly misleading statements 
with respect to human rights audits).  Other claims, however, were dismissed on 
defendants’ motion, see id., and the case was later dismissed entirely, with prejudice, 
based on the parties’ joint stipulation.  See Order Granting Consent Joint Motion for 
Judgment, id. (D.C. Super. Ct. July 14, 2017). 
 163. Ian Ayres, Monetize Labor Practices, in FUNG ET AL., supra note 27, at 80 (“[I]f the 
terms are fair, contracting with the poor can be a good thing.”). 
 164. McCall Smith, supra note 1, at 87. 
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the victim who drowned depended on the putative rescuer, but this 
seems a more accurate statement than to say that he relied on the 
rescuer, and more natural linguistically. 
A reliance argument also goes too far in that reliance would always 
be present if dependence and reliance are the same.  Is it just and 
reasonable to rely on someone?  Probably so, if someone has promised 
or committed to help.  In this way, promises can matter, even if they 
are not contractual promises.165  In that case someone may well rely; 
perhaps we think so because that reliance is now foreseeable and thus 
reasonable and justifiable.166  Someone may make a decision in 
reliance on the promise.  But someone who needs rescue, and who 
thus depends on the rescuer, is in a different position, and the 
potential rescuer is too, if the rescuer has simply happened onto the 
scene afterwards.  The rescuer did not do anything that results in the 
claimed reliance, so to say there is any reliance at all seems strange.  It 
is true of course that the law may impose liability on one person when 
another person depends on him.  Dependence by itself, however, 
cannot be enough.  Then we would all be liable to everyone in the 
world who needs our help. 
In the context of supply chains, there may be no reliance, then, 
especially in the legal and contractual sense.  But there might be in 
some circumstances, and if Western Company were to make 
commitments to the workers—as it should—then they might rely, and 
Western Company should probably be liable.  On the other hand, 
Western Company may prefer to attempt ameliorative measures 
without committing to do so; it may prefer to limit its exposure.  In that 
case, if the workers rely on the bona fide efforts of Western Company, 
should their reliance be legally cognizable?  Traditionally the law 
would in fact recognize such claims in that a person would have no 
duty to rescue, but if he undertook a rescue, he owed a duty of 
reasonable care and could be liable for, say, negligent failure to 
                                               
 165. Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Nat’l Consumers League, 2016 WL 
4080541, at 11 (qualifying language such as “expect,” “goal,” and “ask” shows an 
aspiration rather than a promise or commitment). 
 166. This thinking grounds liability for promissory estoppel, RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (AM. LAW INST. 1981), as well as similar doctrines in other 
legal systems.  See generally David V. Snyder, Hunting Promissory Estoppel, in MIXED 
JURISDICTIONS COMPARED:  PRIVATE LAW IN LOUISIANA AND SCOTLAND 281 (Vernon 
Valentine Palmer & Elspeth Christie Reid eds., 2009). 
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complete the rescue.167  That doctrine, however, gives a serious 
disincentive to rescue and is subject to considerable statutory reversal.  
Those matters are considered in the next section. 
6. The oddest inconvenience 
If I can rescue a stranger at no danger or inconvenience to myself, it 
is hard to imagine why I would not do it, and for that reason, it is hard 
to imagine that my society would not consider it just and reasonable 
that I rescue the victim.  Should I ignore the victim, I would probably 
seem callous to the point of immorality to my friends and compatriots.  
Yet when this, the seemingly most straightforward factor is considered 
in the supply chain context, the fact-situation falls apart. 
At first it seems that the inconvenience of taking responsibility for 
workers in the supply chain is really a matter only of finance and 
marketing.  Arguably the poor working conditions and other ills are 
linked to, if not entirely caused by, the drive for profits and the 
imperative to bring new goods to market speedily.168  Dismissing such 
matters is easy—they are mere business considerations that pale when 
put next to human health, safety, and liberty.  But these considerations 
are the force behind the very existence of any relationship at all 
between the Western buyers and the workers in the developing world.  
Were it not for the economic attraction of the labor markets and 
production facilities in the developing world, Western buyers would 
not have operations or contracts there.  Only if the economic forces 
draw the Western buyers do those buyers have any link with those 
particular workers (assuming that the common link of humanity is too 
diffuse to ground a strong enough moral duty for anyone other than 
saints, as discussed above). 
In that light, pale economic inconvenience turns existential.  If 
taking steps to ameliorate working conditions—i.e., the rescue—erases 
the profitability and speed of production that engendered the 
relationship, the relationship disappears.  The danger or inconvenience 
of rescue, then, is a fundamental factor militating against finding a 
duty.  And while danger is the wrong word where the question is one 
                                               
 167. 2A STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 9:23 (1983) 
(“Generally, the law did not impose liability upon those who stand idly by and fail to 
rescue a stranger . . . .  Under modern law, a duty to use reasonable care to assist 
another in danger has been imposed.  However, Good Samaritan statutes may modify 
this duty or provide for nonliability of rescuers.”).  Good Samaritan laws are discussed 
in the next section.  See infra Section II.C.6. 
 168. E.g., LOCKE, supra note 4, ch. 6. 
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of economic duties or hardships rather than jumping into a roiling 
river, the word is appropriate in that it indicates that whatever benefits, 
economic or otherwise, accrue to the workers because of the supply 
chain could vanish.  Given that in some cases those benefits are crucial 
to the workers’ livelihood (in the literal sense), an imposed duty to 
rescue is questionable.  Western companies would need to assume any 
such duties voluntarily. 
True, once the relationship is started perhaps the moral duties 
attach and cannot be freely escaped.  This conception fits well into the 
doctrine on the duty to rescue; traditional analysis holds that while 
there is no duty to rescue, once a rescue is undertaken it must be 
performed with reasonable care.169  But this common law thinking has 
proved faulty as a matter of policy and has been reversed over time as 
a matter of doctrine by Good Samaritan statutes.  Every jurisdiction in 
the United States has adopted a Good Samaritan statute of one kind 
or another; typically they protect the rescuer from liability.170   
Assuming moderately rational decision making by Western 
companies, then, even without assuming perfectly efficient markets, 
imposition of duties and liability could dry up future markets if the 
economic incentive were to disappear.  Indeed, at least in the 
environmental context, the most success may come from easing rather 
than increasing liability, provided the companies are transparent and 
disclose their environmental problems.171  For this reason, rather than 
imposing liability for failure to meet mandated standards, an approach 
similar to these environmental contexts—essentially Good Samaritan 
statutes for supply chains—may be better.172 
                                               
 169. See AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 9:23. 
 170. See Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Construction and Application of “Good 
Samaritan” Statutes, 68 A.L.R. 4th 294 (1989) (“Good Samaritan statutes are generally 
designed to protect individuals from civil liability for any negligent acts or omissions 
committed while voluntarily providing emergency care.”).  See generally Eric A. Brandt, 
Good Samaritan Laws—The Legal Placebo:  A Current Analysis, 17 AKRON L. REV. 303, 303 
(1984).  A current sampling includes GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-29 (West 2015); MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 604A.01 (West 2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:62A-1 (West 1987); OKLA. STAT. 
TIT. 76, § 5 (West 1979); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.151 (West 2013); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 895.48 (West 2017). 
 171. See Matthew Potoski & Aseem Prakash, The Regulation Dilemma:  Cooperation and 
Conflict in Environmental Governance, 64 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 152, 152 (2004); see also LOCKE, 
supra note 4, at 24 (collecting authorities). 
 172. A careful consideration of this idea is beyond the scope of the present Article, 
but for the reasons stated in the text and the preceding footnote, this approach 
appears to be among the most promising. 
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This logic would seem to be borne out by more granular analysis based 
on a combination of the costs of improving working conditions and the 
strength of corporate conscience.  Let us assume two possibilities. 
(1) Improving working conditions erases economic incentives to 
make goods abroad. 
(2) Improving working conditions reduces but does not eliminate 
economic incentives to make goods abroad, but improving 
conditions and thus reducing incentives in Developing Country A 
provides an incentive to shift production to Developing Country B. 
Let us further assume that corporate conscience is strong enough to 
justify incurring some cost.  In other words, the Western Company 
would not buy cotton picked by child slaves even if it were the least 
expensive option and there were no legal obstacles.  Let us further 
assume that there are no relevant legal obstacles.173  In the first 
scenario, goods will not be made abroad over the long run.  The 
experience of moving production to non-unionized factories in the 
American South, only to see the work migrate away from the South and 
to other countries174 suggests that this possibility is more than 
theoretical.  In either case, the benefits of the economic relationship 
disappear in the long run.  The only way to avoid this result is to impose 
legal regulation worldwide, to impose legal regulation widely enough 
that the only unregulated countries are plagued by conditions that are 
                                               
 173. See supra note 141. 
 174. There are a tremendous number of articles and papers on this subject.  Some 
are rigorous.  E.g., Thomas J. Holmes, The Effect of State Policies on the Location of 
Manufacturing:  Evidence from State Borders, 106 J. POL. ECON. 667 (1998); Edward L. 
Glaeser & Kristina Tobio, The Rise of the Sunbelt (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 13071, 2007), http://www.nber.org/papers/w13071 (attributing data on 
Southern housing supply and prices to the rise in Sunbelt jobs).  Some are scholarly 
but are not quantitative.  Consider the section on “Sweatshop Migrations” in 
SWEATSHOP USA, supra note 67, including Greenwald, supra note 67, at 77; Xiaolan 
Bao, Sweatshops in Sunset Park:  A Variation of the Late-Twentieth-Century Chinese Garment 
Shops in New York City, id. at 117; Edna Bonacich et al., Offshore Production, id. at 141; 
Immanuel Ness, Globalization and Worker Organization in New York City’s Garment Industry, 
id. at 169; Kenneth C. Wolensky, “An Industry on Wheels”:  The Migration of Pennsylvania’s 
Garment Factories, id. at 91.  Others are recent but more journalistic.  E.g., Justin Fox, 
Manufacturing Moved South, Then Moved Out, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 7, 2015, 3:53 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-10-07/manufacturing-moved-south 
-then-it-moved-to-china (tracking the movement of manufacturing jobs from the 
Rustbelt to the Sunbelt then to China); Howard Schneider, U.S. South, Not Just Mexico, 
Stands in Way of Rust Belt Jobs Revival, REUTERS (Apr. 7, 2017, 1:15 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-south-insight/u-s-south-not-just-mexic 
o-stands-in-way-of-rust-belt-jobs-revival-idUSKBN1790HO (attributing the decline in 
rust belt jobs to cheaper labor and more land availability in the South). 
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so bad that either economic constraints (e.g., incompetent workers or 
unreliable production facilities) or corporate conscience would 
prevent shifting production to those countries.  In the paradigm 
assumed for this Article, however, such widespread regulation is 
impossible in the foreseeable future.  So, the bottom line is that the 
inconvenience or danger of rescue might prevent the imposition of a 
duty to rescue, i.e., a duty to improve working conditions.  Still, such 
duties should be voluntarily assumed, perhaps with some incentives 
from Good Samaritan-like immunity. 
III.    IMPLICATIONS 
A.   Preservation of the Non-Legal Channel of Relationships 
The previous section argued that there is a moral duty to protect the 
human rights of workers in international supply chains, although that 
duty may be stronger or weaker depending on a variety of factors.  
Despite this moral duty, the case for public legal protection of workers 
in international supply chains is surprisingly ambivalent.  In an ideal 
world, there is no question that there would be such protection.  But 
in an ideal world it would not be necessary, and this Article takes a 
pragmatic approach that includes current political, geographical, 
economic, and commercial realities. 
The obvious argument is to impose as much in the way of human rights 
protections as possible.  This would seem strong.  The moral reasons for 
it are intuitive, and a careful consideration, like that attempted above, 
corroborates the intuition.  Further, the leading empirical work by Provost 
Locke suggests that significant progress is possible only if private efforts 
and public involvement can come together.175  This carefully researched 
finding itself corroborates another intuition:  that public and private 
efforts will be more successful together than either could be separately.  
All of this would suggest that public regulation would be beneficial as a 
matter of policy, as well as a matter of morals. 
I am not in the end sure, however.  Although the UN Guiding 
Principles176 managed to achieve the goals of garnering corporate 
commitments and establishing a broad framework, the Principles 
                                               
 175. LOCKE, supra note 4, at 17 passim.  This conclusion is perhaps clearest with 
respect to the positive relationship between a country’s laws and regulations, on the 
one hand, and Nike M-Audit scores for its suppliers, based on extensive and rigorous 
data collection and statistical analysis, on the other.  See id. at 58. 
 176. See supra note 9. 
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themselves are general and vague.  An outside observer, bewildered by 
the plethora of standards from the NGO side alone, would note a lack 
of consensus, and when the corporate side is added, it appears that no 
agreement can be reached with respect to what public regulation 
would provide.  The sort of minimal duties enacted in some places 
already (due diligence, or disclosure)177 may do little harm, but they 
may also do little good,178 and they are not costless.  With a lack of 
consensus, public regulation may well wind up being expensive and 
ineffective.  In addition, the disagreement may lead to a law that is 
hopelessly compromised, making it even more expensive and 
ineffective than a law that is merely bromidic or disclosure-oriented.  
In other words, efforts at public regulation may not be productive, and 
they could distract from private efforts that might establish standards 
or norms that, after experience with implementation, could eventually 
be turned into public regulation. 
The concern that ambitious regulation could also hurt the economies 
of developing countries, deprive workers of desperately needed jobs, 
and result in a de facto protectionist regime is another reason militating 
against adoption of unduly ambitious public regulation.179  Such 
arguments must be approached with caution, even skepticism:  taken to 
their extreme, they would suggest that no regulation at all is ever a good 
idea.  But these arguments do require a robust and forthright 
response—either that those costs are worth bearing, which would 
require a careful empirical examination, or that the arguments 
themselves are flawed and that there are no such costs, at least not of 
significance.  But my research has not disclosed such a robust response.  
To be sure, the literature disparages the arguments and casts them in 
pejorative terms,180 but what I have not found is an answer to them. 
A final concern is that publicly imposed liability for human rights 
problems in supply chains could, in fact, be counterproductive.  This 
is what Judge Johnston decried in Rahaman.181  If a corporation like 
                                               
 177. See supra note 11. 
 178. See Chilton & Sarfaty, supra note 26, at 20–25, 45 (arguing supply chain 
disclosures are unlikely to help decrease human rights abuses). 
 179. See supra notes 61–64 and accompanying text (on protectionism). 
 180. Consider HAPKE, supra note 36, at 132–35. 
 181. Rahaman v. J.C. Penney Corp., No. N15C-07-174MMJ, 2016 WL 2616375, at *9 
n.68 (Del. Super. Ct. May 4, 2016).  In short, tort doctrine encourages buyers to 
distance themselves from the supply chain and to “ignore[ ] workplace safety” as a 
means to “escape liability”; “the better rule would be to encourage general contractors 
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Western Company exposes itself to liability by undertaking to improve 
working conditions in its supply chain, it will have every reason to 
divorce itself from such matters, or to move its operations somewhere 
safer.  The first alternative is certainly not desirable; the second is at 
best debatable.  True, if public regulation were to require the company 
to improve working conditions, then the company would have to do so 
and (we will assume) could not escape.  But if nothing else, that does 
not seem a likely possibility at present, and the paradigm that applies 
in this Article assumes as much. 
None of this is a great surprise, although it is not the answer that 
many would like to hear.  Differing countries, cultures, expectations, 
stages of development—all can be expected to make harmonized 
standards difficult.  And supply chain problems have been intractable 
for decades.  But there is a more fundamental aspect, based on the 
law’s own limits.  The classical theorists of obligations recognized 
centuries ago the practical problems of turning all moral obligations 
into legal ones.  The common law for these reasons has long held 
moral obligations to have limited legal effects.182  Typically such 
obligations are binding in the forum of the conscience but not in a 
legal forum.183  In this the common law is following (or parallels) 
thinking in the civil law.184  In short, we are on familiar ground when 
contract law separates legal obligation from moral duty and provides 
the latter with limited legal effects.  And this may be a good result, 
given differing views on moral commitments.  The moral obligations 
of the common law and the natural obligations of the civil law (so 
called because they are based on natural law)185 are infamously difficult 
to define, so it is typical for them to be left to non-legal enforcement.  
In the eyes of the law, they can be only “imperfect” obligations, and 
judicial efforts to incorporate them into law (such as the efforts of Lord 
                                               
to take all reasonable measures to ensure the safety of all workers.”  Id.; see supra notes 
92–93 and accompanying text. 
 182. E.g., Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207 (1825); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 86 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
 183. Mills, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) at 209 (in foro conscientiæ). 
 184. See 2 ROBERT JOSEPH POTHIER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS OR 
CONTRACTS 2 n.(a) (William D. Evans trans., 1806) (le for de la conscience). 
 185. In civil law theory and history, natural obligations are typically tied to the views 
of the Romans.  E.g., PIERRE CORNIOLEY, NATURALIS OBLIGATIO:  ESSAI SUR L’ORIGINE ET 
L’EVOLUTION DE LA NOTION EN DROIT ROMAIN (1964); Marcel Planiol, Assimilation 
Progressive de l’Obligation Naturelle et du Devoir Moral, 62  REVUE CRITIQUE DE LEGISLATION 
ET DE JURISPRUDENCE 152 (1913). 
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Mansfield) are typically disparaged.186  Although few in the world of 
human rights welcome it, the decision of the Supreme Court in Jesner 
v. Arab Bank, PLC187 will accord with this side of the argument as it 
makes legal liability against corporations more difficult to impose. 
These arguments against public regulation need to be recognized, 
and ideally, answered.  At the same time, there are strong arguments 
in favor of public regulation, put forward most convincingly by Provost 
Locke based on his extensive empirical investigation.  At present, then, 
the case seems unclear with respect to public regulation, particularly 
when geopolitical realities are taken into account.  That makes the 
effective use of private regulation all the more important. 
B.   The New Social Contracts, New Governance, and New Model Contract 
Clauses—Toward a Version 2.0 
The discussion so far shows the hope that may be pinned on the 
MCCs, but the empirical studies, the theoretical literature, and the 
advocacy pieces all seem to underscore the limits of the approach 
taken by the MCCs.  This is particularly true with respect to their 
emphasis on punishing noncomplying suppliers188 and their 
concentration of power in the hands of grasping Western (or 
Northern) buyers subservient to their greedy Western (or Northern) 
markets.  Yet a successful business lawyer must cling to optimism; 
otherwise, no big deal would ever close.  Even knowing the 
compromises, holes—and thus risks—of the last deal, new deals await, 
and in this case the research points the way. 
To the extent the musings in the previous section are correct, the 
“braiding” of formal and informal contractual obligations suggests a 
promising path for a new approach, extrapolating from the research 
of Professors Gilson, Sabel, and Scott.  They show how such structures 
have worked in contracts for innovation,189 and the strategies they 
explore might be transposed to the supply chain context.  There 
                                               
 186. A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT:  THE RISE OF 
THE ACTION OF ASSUMPSIT 323 (1975). 
 187. 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018). 
 188. Compare LOCKE, supra note 4, at 20 (on the limits of deterrence mechanisms), 
with Dadush, supra note 27, at 1534–46 (on the buyer’s contribution to violation 
through purchasing practices). 
 189. Ronald J. Gilson et al., Braiding:  The Interaction of Formal and Informal 
Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377 (2010) (arguing 
braided contracts involve low-powered sanctions for formal contractual obligations 
that complement, not crowd-out, the informal contractual obligations). 
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should be room for formal and enforceable obligations as well as 
informal ones that are not legally enforceable, although they may be 
implemented by the parties themselves through contractual 
mechanisms that they set up themselves.  The parties effectuate this 
strategy through formal governance structures—in essence, the 
contracts are more about establishing joint governance structures than 
about setting rules.190  This organization allows for learning191 and for 
the development of rules and norms as the parties learn from each 
other in an echo of the “reflexive regulation” or “experimentalist 
governance” practices that have been of so much interest to political 
scientists.  Similarly, William Simon has shown how John Dewey’s 
pragmatism can combine with liberal politics and emerging business 
practices.192  As lawyers devote more time and energy to understanding 
supply chain operations,193 these insights can be harnessed to improve 
not only product innovation and manufacturing but also human rights 
protections for workers.  Buyers have plenty of reasons to have their 
own personnel on factory floors in their suppliers’ countries; as the 
parties learn in each other’s presence, they can improve efficiency, 
quality, and human rights.194  This reflexive (or reflective) governance, 
mutual learning, and mutual disruption may be the most promising 
path forward.  These are large matters with a deep, multifaceted, and 
evolving literature, and taking advantage of their insights and power 
will require further work.  But incorporation of Model Contract 
Clauses 2.0, if the clauses establish governance mechanisms to enable 
the kind of learning and improvement envisioned by these thinkers, 
will make the supply contracts even more like social contracts.  Social 
contracts are, after all, about instituting structures of governance and 
not simply about establishing rules and norms. 
                                               
 190. See id. at 1382–83. 
 191. E.g., GARY HERRIGEL, MANUFACTURING POSSIBILITIES:  CREATIVE ACTION AND 
INDUSTRIAL RECOMPOSITION IN THE UNITED STATES, GERMANY, AND JAPAN (2010). 
 192. See William H. Simon, Toyota Jurisprudence:  Legal Theory and Rolling Rule Regimes, 
in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 63 (Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne 
Scott eds., 2006); William H. Simon, The Institutional Configuration of Deweyan Democracy, 
9 CONTEMP. PRAGMATISM 5 (2012). 
 193. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts:  Social Capital and Network 
Governance in Procurement Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 561 (2015); see also Charles F. 
Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Neither Modularity nor Relational Contracting:  Inter-Firm 
Collaboration in the New Economy, 5 ENTERPRISE & SOC’Y 388 (2004). 
 194. See LOCKE, supra note 4, at 60 (explaining that more Nike personnel visits at a supplier 
factory correlate with higher M-Audit scores); see also id. at 19 (harnessing “experimentalist 
governance” and “responsive regulation” for protecting workers in supply chains). 
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CONCLUSION 
The MCCs are a strong and important step in a complex terrain.  
They encourage and enable private efforts to improve conditions in 
supply chains, with sensitivity to legal and pragmatic issues like the 
need to manage risk, limit client exposure, and navigate corporate 
politics.  In that landscape, there is a strong temptation to do nothing, 
or as little as possible, but serious strides are required not only because 
of growing legal obligations but because of the pressing moral duty to 
act, the human impetus for compassion, the crucial commitment to 
equality—and the (assumed) unlikelihood of widely effective public 
regulation in the foreseeable future.  Particularly because effective 
public regulation, given practical and political realities, is less certain 
than might be thought, an avenue for private action is especially 
critical.  The MCCs aim to put companies on this road in a way that 
they will find not only practical but valuable. 
As the previous section suggests, a second version of the MCCs, radically 
revised and wholly reoriented, beckons with a sense of further hope.  For 
some, the current MCCs may seem like a step that is unduly short and 
cautious.  But it is a strong step, and a first step enables a second, and hope 
springs from the knowledge that second steps can be longer.  The 
learning from the last few years might be brought to bear on the next 
version of the MCCs, but those insights contemplate a different kind of 
supply chain management, implemented currently by some companies 
but not by many, along with different kinds of contracts.  Next steps will 
also likely take into account movements into distributed ledger 
technology (often called block chain), a powerful tool both for managing 
supply chains and potentially for monitoring human rights. 
But those are next steps.  In the meantime, the current MCCs allow 
companies to start moving now, whether on their own or in concert 
with (or at the prodding of) public authorities and civil society.  The 
project provides a valve through which human rights and humane 
compassion can enter the legal and operational realms of the 
corporate world, harnessing natural self-interest and shared morality 
into a legal and social structure that spans heedlessly across national 
boundaries and that pulls multinational enterprises into social 
contracts previously constrained by geographic borders and old-
fashioned notions of nation-states.  Whether in their current version 
or the next, the MCCs offer hope, but both now and for as long as we 
can see, the work will need to continue. 
